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Chapter 1
Introduction
The last three decades saw an extraordinary increase in cross-border capital flows and the
elimination of barriers to free capital mobility. From a historical perspective, however,
financial globalization is not a new phenomenon. A first wave of globalization started in
the middle of the 19th century and came to an abrupt end with World War I. This era
was characterized by a high level of integration reached again only in the 1990s. Obst-
feld and Taylor (2004) characterize the development stages of global financial markets,
connecting financial globalization in the 19th century with the present, by the exchange
rate regimes and their consequences for capital flows. During the period from 1870 until
1914, most countries successively adopted the classical gold standard and both capital
and labor markets were highly integrated. Policymakers followed a laissez-faire policy
and few restrictions were imposed on financial markets. The following period, between
1914 to 1945, was shaped by the two World Wars and the Great Depression leading to
a rise in nationalism. During this time, policymakers increasingly focused on domestic
goals and pursued protectionist policies. Capital controls were put in place to pursue
monetary policy under more flexible exchange rates. As a consequence, private capi-
tal flows ceased and national financial markets decoupled. The Bretton Woods system
characterized the period between 1945 and 1971 when currencies were linked through
a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates to the US-Dollar. However, significant
capital controls were in place and allowed countries some policy autonomy. Financial
markets started to reintegrate; the process, however, was slow and mainly driven by
international trade flows. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971,
the developed countries moved towards more flexible exchange rates, capital account
restrictions were successively lifted and capital increasingly flowed across borders. How-
ever, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and others estimate that only in the 1990s did capital
mobility regain the degree achieved in 1914.
The development phases of global financial markets are strongly influenced by the
1
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macroeconomic policy trilemma between free capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and
independent monetary policy (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998). High capital mobility is only
reconcilable with fixed exchange rates when monetary policy is subordinated to these
goals and with the pursuit of domestic goals only when the exchange rate is allowed to
adjust to market conditions. The simultaneous achievement of domestic policy goals and
exchange rate stability is only feasible when capital controls are in place. This trilemma
helps in understanding the ups and downs in financial integration.
After the breakdown of Bretton Woods and the financial liberalization in the 1970s,
countries did not only experience increased real and nominal exchange rate volatility
but also a variety of crises. Hence, financial integration poses significant challenges for
policymaking. This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters studying financial
globalization and the implications for monetary and exchange rate policy. Chapter 2
analyzes the empirical patterns underlying exchange rate regime announcements and
deviations in de facto policies and highlights the role of financial integration. Chapter 3
focuses on the consequences of financial openness for monetary policy, more specifically,
for inflation targeting. Financial globalization in the 19th century is the focus of chapter
4 which examines the role of Germany as a financial center.
The increasing capital mobility and the emerging market crises in the 1990s led to the
bipolar view and the observation of fear of floating which are the starting points for the
analysis in chapter 2. In accordance with the policy trilemma, the bipolar view states
that countries should move towards the extreme corners of exchange rate flexibility by
either joining a monetary union, unilaterally adopting the currency of another country, or
operating a currency board, thereby, surrendering monetary independence, or by having
a freely floating exchange rate (Fischer, 2001). Intermediate exchange rate regimes,
more precisely soft pegs, are not considered viable as long as capital is internationally
mobile. Figure 2.2 illustrates that for the two reference years of Fischer, 1991 and 1999,
there was indeed a shift from announced (de jure) intermediate exchange rate regimes to
fixed and flexible ones. A more continuous appraisal of regime choices, however, is much
less clear-cut and the high share of de facto intermediate regimes throughout the 1990s
further challenges the bipolar view. Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that
it is not uncommon for countries to declare a different exchange rate regime than they
actually follow (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). However, the observation of fear of floating
raises the question: If countries indeed have good reasons to manage their exchange rate
actively, why would they not announce a regime consistent with optimal policies?
2
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Starting from this observation, chapter 2 studies the apparent disconnect between
what countries announce to be their exchange rate regime and what they de facto imple-
ment.1 Discrepancies between announcements and de facto policies are a quantitatively
important phenomenon describing policies in roughly 40 per cent of all countries. Nev-
ertheless, there is still a lack of understanding of actual patterns and underlying reasons.
The aim of chapter 2 is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies. Starting from
the hypothesis that observed regime discrepancies are systematic, i.e., not the result of
random policy errors, it provides evidence for the existence of systematic elements in
observed regime discrepancies by linking them to specific country characteristics. The
main empirical finding is that countries tend to communicate exchange rate regimes at
the corners of the flexibility spectrum, i.e., either fixed or flexible regimes, but to op-
erate intermediate regimes. Whether countries announce a fixed or flexible exchange
rate depends on country characteristics, in particular related to trade structure, finan-
cial development, and financial openness. Also, countries at different stages of economic
and financial development differ in the nature of regime discrepancies. Finally, the
decreasing frequency of countries managing their exchange rate less than announced
and the increasing occurrence of countries intervening more than announced align with
broader economic trends and developments worldwide related to financial globalization
and changes in monetary policy design.
The separation of communication and implementation of exchange rate policy may
provide policymakers with an additional tool to tackle challenges from financial global-
ization. In an era of high financial integration and capital mobility, countries may not be
restrained to choose between pursuing an independent monetary policy and stable ex-
change rates while refraining from capital controls. For numerous countries the optimal
policy may be neither of the two extremes but a combination. However, as intermedi-
ate exchange rate regimes are difficult to communicate, see, e.g., Frankel, Fajnzylber,
Schmukler and Serven (2001), countries may find it optimal to use exchange rate regime
announcements and a diverging implementation as a second best policy.
The empirical patterns point at the role of monetary policy within the macroeconomic
policy trilemma. Especially emerging market economies that adopted inflation targeting
and, hence, announce flexible exchange rates, manage their exchange rate more than
announced. This is not surprising as the exchange rate is one, if not the most important
price in an open economy. As small open economies steadily move away from fixed
1Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Uli Klüh.
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exchange rates towards a more independent monetary policy, open economy aspects
become increasingly important in analyzing monetary policy. The literature frequently
resorts to two simple concepts in international economics, purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity, to describe the relation between prices, interest rates, and
exchange rates between countries. Although the empirical relevance of these two concepts
is subject to an ongoing debate, they are frequently used in theoretical models. Chapter
3 examines the implications of these concepts on the implementation of monetary policy.
Monetary policy is analyzed in an open economy version of the standard New Keynesian
framework described by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999). More specifically, flexible
inflation targeting as characterized by Svensson (2007) is the monetary policy under
scrutiny. A central bank operating under flexible inflation targeting is not only concerned
about stabilizing the inflation rate around the target but additionally about stabilizing
the real economy.
Purchasing power parity is based on the idea that international goods arbitrage keeps
the relative purchasing power of two currencies constant over time. Uncovered interest
rate parity is derived from arbitrage in international financial markets according to which
the nominal exchange rate adjusts to interest rate differentials. Chapter 3 contributes
to the literature by analyzing in a unified framework how these two concepts and pos-
sible alternatives used in the literature affect monetary policy. More specifically, the
implications for the interest rate reaction function describing monetary policy responses
to shocks under flexible inflation targeting are examined. Thereby, useful insights into
the consequences of using the simple concepts of purchasing power parity and uncovered
interest rate parity in monetary policy analysis are provided.
The main insight is that the interest rate reaction function is affected when purchasing
power parity and uncovered interest rate parity are relaxed. As long as purchasing power
parity holds, monetary policy reacts only to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks.
If, however, purchasing power parity does not hold, monetary policy also fully offsets the
effects of foreign shocks. Furthermore, not the direction but the strength of the interest
rate response to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks is affected. Whether the
relation between interest rates and exchange rates is described by uncovered interest
rate parity or in the more generic way proposed by Ball (1999) does affect both to which
type of shocks monetary policy responds and how strong the response is.
Then, chapter 4 turns to the earlier period of financial globalization. Here, financial
globalization in the late 19th century is analyzed from the perspective of Germany
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as a financial center.2 Feis (1930) describes Europe as the world’s banker during the
19th century, lending capital to countries around the world. The main capital exporter
was Great Britain, followed by France and Germany, and their capital cities were the
main financial centers intermediating credit through their stock exchanges and bankers.
London emerged as an important financial center following the Napoleonic Wars and
became the undisputed international financial center in the 1870s. Paris was another
important financial center in the 19th century, second only to London, and contributed
significantly to the financing of foreign governments and railroads since the 1820s. At the
beginning of the 19th century, Frankfurt was the financial center of Germany and also of
importance on an international level. Following the political and economic restructurings
during the mid 1860s, Berlin developed as Germany’s financial center. The construction
of the railroads and the development of heavy industries in the 19th century posed new
challenges to the financial sector until then dominated by private bankers. The immense
demand for capital of these newly developing sectors required the use of a broader capital
base and the introduction of tradable securities allowed private investors to put their
savings into productive use. The stock exchanges and the newly created joint-stock
banks contributed significantly in expanding financial intermediation.
The capital exports of a country are one way to quantify its importance as an inter-
national financial center. While the characteristics of British capital flows have been
studied extensively, France and Germany as smaller capital exporters have been inves-
tigated to a lesser degree and to our knowledge no extensive data sets are available.
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by providing new insights into the role of Ger-
many as a financial center. The development and functioning of the German capital
markets in the late 19th and early 20th century are described with a special focus on the
intermediation of foreign securities provided by the stock exchanges. Then, the capital
intermediated by German stock exchanges in the thirty years prior to World War I and
its composition, especially of foreign investment, is analyzed. The main findings are that
neighboring countries were the main recipients of German capital and that the perceived
riskiness of a country was an important determinant in investment decisions. Borrow-
ers frequently floated their securities simultaneously in the main financial centers. To
give a first idea of the integration between financial centers at that time, we examine
if foreign issuances in Germany reacted to shocks in the other financial centers. The
main finding is that the conditions in financial markets in Germany and relative to other
2This chapter is based on joint work with Graciela Kaminsky.
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financial centers mattered for the amount of foreign securities floated in Germany. More
specifically, France and Germany seem to be substitute financial centers for borrowing
countries while the relation between Germany and the UK is unclear.
The present thesis provides insights into financial globalization and the challenges it
poses. Increasing capital mobility calls policymakers to choose between the pursuit of
exchange rate objectives and domestic goals. However, optimal choices are likely to be
neither of the two extremes and chapter 2 provides evidence of actual policy choices aim-
ing at intermediate solutions. Chapter 3 studies how the implementation of monetary
policy is affected by the financial and economic openness of an economy. By analyzing
financial globalization in a historical perspective, the last chapter spurs our understand-
ing of fundamental patterns in financial markets and integration. All three chapters
are part of a broader research agenda that aims at improving our understanding of the
pieces jointly forming the macroeconomic policy trilemma, how they relate theoretically
and empirically. This broader research agenda can hopefully be pursued in the future.
6
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When countries do not do what they say:
Systematic discrepancies between exchange
rate regime announcements and de facto
policies1
2.1 Introduction
A look at the exchange rate regime choices of 133 countries over the period 1973-2004
reveals a striking phenomenon: nearly one half of all observations show inconsistencies
between what countries officially declare to be their chosen regime, and what countries
actually do with respect to exchange rate management. Moreover, the exact nature of
deviations seems to follow secular trends. In the early 1970s, countries that managed
their exchange rate less than what could be expected given their announcement domi-
nated the picture, but their share has decreased over time. The frequency of observing
a country intervening more than announced, however, has been increasing, in particular
in the 1990s and 2000s, a trend that has recently attracted substantial attention from
policymakers and academics (see, for example, Barajas, Erickson and Steiner (2008)).
Only the proportion of consistent regimes has remained roughly constant.
The finding that countries often do not follow their exchange rate regime announce-
ment has important implications for research and policy. Most importantly, studies on
the relationship between exchange rate policies and economic development (Aghion, Bac-
chetta, Ranciere and Rogoff, 2006)2, financial stability (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2003),
or the emergence of inflation targeting as a preferred monetary policy regime for emerging
1This chapter is based on joint work with Uli Klüh.
2Genberg and Swoboda (2005) show that both announcement and actual exchange rate policy matter
for the economic performance of a country.
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markets (Goldstein, 2002) will remain incomplete without an understanding of regime
discrepancies. It is therefore not surprising that recent years saw the emergence of a
whole body of literature reviewing the proper definition, nature and implication of de
jure and de facto exchange rate regime choices, including the seminal contributions by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a; 2003b; 2005).
We know that discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate policies
are common, but we have a poor understanding of the underlying reasons. Most im-
portantly, and contrary to some statements in related contributions, the literature on
the fear of floating phenomenon initiated by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) does not pro-
vide an answer to the question: If countries indeed have good reasons to manage their
exchange rate actively, why would they not announce a regime consistent with optimal
policies? Put differently, while the literature offers several theoretical explanations why
countries dislike exchange rate fluctuations3 and why countries may be forced to abandon
fixed exchange rate regimes4, we know little about systematic and potentially voluntary
deviations between announced and actual exchange rate policies.
Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, there are only four contributions that address this ques-
tion more or less directly. Carmignani, Colombo and Tirelli (2006) study the role of
political factors in explaining regime choices more broadly, also touching upon the issue
of “broken promises”. The authors argue that, in general, countries attempt to choose
de facto and de jure regimes consistently, except for those cases in which political in-
centives lead to some form of cheating or dynamic inconsistency. While the authors do
not attempt to provide an “immediate theoretical interpretation” for their findings, an
implicit assumption of the study seems to be that the stronger the incentive to peg or
float the stronger the incentive to do so consistently, and that deviations from this policy
either mirror politically motivated or wrong decision-making.
Von Hagen and Zhou (2006) view regime gaps as part of an error-correction mechanism
that allows governments to adjust their actual policies in case the de jure regime has
been chosen sub-optimally. Such a view, however, does not explain why de jure regimes
are chosen sub-optimally in the first place. This is particularly troublesome since many
of the significant explanatory variables used in their regression analysis do not change
3See, in particular, the literature on fear of floating started by the seminal contribution of Calvo and
Reinhart (2002).
4See the literature on currency crises, e.g. Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1996).
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much over time, implying that they could have been taken into account by policymakers
ex ante. Similarly, a dynamic error-correction mechanism should allow for the possibility
of adapting the de jure regime to changing circumstances or policy misjudgments. Such a
mechanism, however, cannot be identified in the data, since regime discrepancies display
substantial persistence.
Alesina and Wagner (2006) analyze the relationship between regime discrepancies
and the quality of institutions. They find that countries with low institutional quality
tend to announce pegs, but are unable to sustain them. At the same time, countries
with high institutional quality tend to either consistently float or to actively manage the
exchange rate without announcing it. Alesina and Wagner (2006) interpret this behavior
as indication of a signaling game, in which countries with relatively good institutions try
to distinguish themselves from countries with low institutional quality. While signaling
might indeed play an important role in explaining regime discrepancies, the evidence
provided to support this view suffers from two major shortcomings. First, proxies for
institutional quality display very little variation over time. Consequently, the quality
of institutions cannot explain trends in the data. Second, Alesina and Wagner do not
explain why countries with low-quality institutions announce a peg in this signaling
setting. This, in turn, also calls into question the validity of the signaling strategy
more generally, since policymakers confronted with low-quality institutions have a clear
incentive to imitate their counterparts, given that the expected reputation gain of an
announced but not consistently implemented peg is likely to be small. Consequently,
a crucial question becomes how markets and the public actually react to attempts of
“signaling by inconsistency”.
Starting from this last observation, Barajas, Erickson and Steiner (2008) study the
reaction of emerging market bond spreads to de jure and de facto exchange rate regime
choices. They test the hypothesis that countries classified towards a flexible exchange
rate regime are rewarded with lower spreads. As to the potential reasons for fearing
to declare a more interventionist regime, the authors argue that markets might have a
subjective bias against officially fixed exchange rate regimes. This bias could be either
due to the fact that fixed exchange rates have received much of the blame for the emerging
market crises in the 1990s, or be the result of the perceived advantage of operating an
inflation targeting regime. Their main finding is that contrary to the working hypothesis
both the announcement of a more heavily managed regime and the actual intensity
of intervention lower spreads significantly. This leaves the puzzle why countries are
9
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reluctant to declare that they are intervening given that international capital markets
do not reward either de facto or de jure floaters.
Aim and outline of the study
While none of the mentioned contributions offers a clear-cut theoretical explanation
for the observed discrepancies, they all start from certain implicit presumptions about
the underlying phenomenon. Implicit in the analysis is either the view that deviations
between announced and implemented policies are the result of sub-optimal policies, or
the reflection of some underlying political or institutional reality, or a subjective bias
in market perceptions. Apart from Alesina and Wagner (2006), existing contributions
usually assume that inconsistencies to one side or the other can be analyzed separately.
Also, issues of policy communication are treated very lightly, in spite of the fact that
inflation targeting (a communication framework) is sometimes suspected to underpin
more recent trends in the data. Finally, trends over time are usually not studied but
taken for granted, in that the fear of floating phenomenon represents the motivation for
the inquiry.
The aim of this study is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies. First
and foremost, we believe that the existing knowledge of time-series and cross-sectional
patterns of regime discrepancies is highly incomplete. Before testing specific hypotheses
about the reasons for and the consequences of different arrangements, it is therefore
essential to first identify empirical regularities that could form the basis of establishing a
set of robust stylized facts. To this end, we extend the existing de jure regime classifica-
tion for the years 2000 until 2004 and pay particular attention to regional patterns and
clustering, methodological issues in defining regimes, as well as country characteristics.
While our main interest lies in establishing a series of patterns without starting from
restrictive presumptions, it is obviously impossible to operate in a theory vacuum: As
indicated in the title, our working hypothesis is that observed regime discrepancies are
systematic, i.e. not the result of random policy errors. In fact, one of our main objectives
is to provide evidence for the existence of systematic elements in observed regime dis-
crepancies, by linking them to specific country characteristics. Put differently, we show
that there indeed are country characteristics that systematically lead decision-makers
to favor one type of deviation from consistency. For the case of regime discrepancies,
this either means that there are actual or perceived benefits from not declaring that a
certain intervention strategy is being followed, or from declaring a policy that will not
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be always followed.
In providing evidence for systematic discrepancies between declaration and imple-
mentation, we highlight the importance of regime announcements as elements of a more
comprehensive communication framework for monetary and exchange rate policies. At
first glance, the idea that inconsistencies between announcements and policies could
serve a purpose seems difficult to maintain, as markets and the public would either an-
ticipate ex ante or punish ex post deviations from announcements. This, however, is
not necessarily the case if one takes into account the potentially constructive role of
ambiguity. As pointed out in Best (2005), a work closely related to ours, ambiguity can
serve a purpose by keeping policy regimes flexible enough to adapt to changing economic
and political circumstances as well as to re-equilibrate conflicting interests.
Our main empirical finding is that countries tend to communicate exchange rate
regimes at the corners of the flexibility spectrum, i.e. either fixed or flexible regimes, but
to operate intermediate regimes. Whether countries announce a fixed or a freely floating
exchange rate regime depends on country characteristics, in particular related to trade
structure, financial development, and financial openness. Countries at different stages of
economic and financial development differ in the nature of regime discrepancies. Finally,
the decreasing frequency of countries managing their exchange rate less than announced
and the increasing occurrence of countries intervening more than announced align with
broader economic trends and developments worldwide.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data; section
2.3 analyzes time trends and joint factors of regime discrepancies. In section 2.4 a
descriptive statistical analysis of deviations of de facto from announced exchange rate
regimes is presented. Section 2.5 contains the econometric analysis and an interpretation
of the findings. The last section concludes and gives an outlook on future research.
2.2 Data
Our sample covers 133 countries from 1973 to 2004. The countries are classified as
high, upper middle, lower middle, or low income countries according to the classification
provided by the World Bank for 2004. Table 2.2 in the appendix lists the countries
included in the sample.
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2.2.1 Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies
Our analysis focuses on the announcement and actual implementation of exchange rate
policy. Until 1999, the announcement strategy is measured by the de jure exchange rate
regimes as categorized by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) based on the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) data. The
AREAER contains the intended exchange rate policies that member countries reported
to the IMF on an annual basis5. To cover more recent trends, we extend the de jure
regime classification for the years 2000-2004, allowing us to employ a new and unique
dataset. To update regime announcements, we start with information from AREAER,
which since 1998 does not report de jure classifications anymore, but contains additional
verbal information that often allows identification of a country’s stated regime choice. We
combine this information with other sources, such as IMF staff reports and central banks
reports, to complete and cross-check our data. Due to data limitations and consistency
concerns, we only distinguish between fixed, intermediate, and flexible exchange rate
regimes, consolidating the more detailed classification of Ghosh et al. (2002) into these
three groups.6
We capture the actual intervention strategy through the de facto exchange rate regime
classification (“natural” classification) developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). One
of the key characteristics of this classification method is the use of data on parallel
and dual exchange rate markets. These market-determined exchange rates are often
a better measure of actual and expected future monetary policy. In addition, they
usually capture the economic impact of exchange rate changes more directly than official
exchange rates, and do thus display a closer relationship to other variables of interest. To
identify exchange rate regimes, Reinhart and Rogoff separate observations with unified
exchange markets from those with parallel or dual markets. The de facto classification
of the former is then obtained by statistical verification of regime announcements or,
in cases without announcement, by direct statistical interference, which is also used
for country-year observations with dual or parallel markets. The statistical evaluation
5In most of the years covered by our sample, countries were required to assign themselves to one
of four categories (fixed, limited flexibility, managed floating, and independently floating). For an
exposition of the IMF classification and changes over time, see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Ghosh et al. (2002) extended these groups to fifteen buckets, see table 2.1.
6The exact mapping is shown in table 2.1. Our coarse classification corresponds to the one used
by Ghosh et al. (2002) with the exception of the secret basket pegs which we include into the
intermediate category instead of the fixed one. We explain the reasons in section 2.A.1 in the
appendix.
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measures de facto exchange rate behavior via the mean absolute monthly change in
the market-determined (official or parallel) nominal exchange rate, based on a five-year
moving window.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) use fourteen buckets for their regime classification. How-
ever, as the categorizations of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes are not con-
gruent, we regroup them into three broad categories: fixed, intermediate, and floating
regimes; the precise mapping is presented in table 2.1.7 The Reinhart and Rogoff dataset
covers 153 countries for the period 1946-2001. For the years 2002-2004 we use the up-
date of the “natural” classification provided by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006).8
Compared to other de facto classifications, e.g., the widely used dataset by Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2005), the IMF de facto classification used in Bubula and Ötker-
Robe (2002), or the recent compilation by Klein and Shambaugh (2006), the Reinhart
and Rogoff dataset has the advantage of offering the most extensive country and time
coverage9. Moreover, we see at least two methodological reasons to prefer the Reinhart
and Rogoff classification. First, the use of market-determined exchange rates seems to
provide a much better picture of the underlying economic policies than official rates do
and all other de facto classifications rely on official exchange rates. Reinhart and Rogoff
point out that parallel markets are frequently used as back-door floating, in most cases
with simultaneous exchange controls. In these situations, the use of official rates would
strongly bias the results towards observing consistency between de jure and de facto
fixed regimes. Second, Reinhart and Rogoff take the perspective of larger and more
continuous regimes by using a five-year moving window, making it less likely to wrongly
identify a one-time devaluation or shock as a regime change.
A drawback of the Reinhart and Rogoff approach is that only the unconditional volatil-
ity of the nominal exchange rate is used, so measures of intervention intensity such as
international reserve and interest rate changes are not taken into account. Thus, no
clear distinction can be made between exchange rate stability arising from active poli-
7Our three groups correspond to the coarse classification provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) when
categories 2 and 3 are subsumed as intermediate and 4 and 5 as floating regimes.
8This data covers the years 1990-2004. If observations not classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
during that period were classified by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) we use the improved data.
9The IMF de facto classification is available only since 1990. The Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)
classification suffers from a substantial number of unclassified observations due to a lack of data,
especially on international reserves. Klein and Shambaugh’s (2006) classification distinguishes only
between fixed and floating exchange rates which we consider insufficient as intermediate regimes are
quantitatively important and different in nature from fixed and floating regimes as discussed later
on. Frankel and Wei (2008) propose a novel synthesis of techniques to determine de facto exchange
rate regimes.
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cies or from the absence of shocks, leading to a potential overestimation of de facto fixed
exchange rate regimes. Although Reinhart and Rogoff provide evidence that potential
biases are limited, the possibility should be kept in mind. Nonetheless, we consider the
Reinhart and Rogoff classification the one most suitable to the questions we post. To
check robustness, we test the sensitivity of our results against Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger’s (2005) classification, which includes the volatility of international reserves, but does
not take into account interest rate policy.
Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of de jure and de facto exchange rate regime combinations.
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With respect to the concrete alternatives policymakers are facing, it is useful to start
with a taxonomy of de jure and de facto regime combinations (figure 2.1). Our aim is to
find empirical regularities related to a country’s choice to locate either to the northeast
(with a strategy combination in which policymakers intervene more than announced, or
IMA) or to the southwest (with a strategy combination in which policymakers intervene
less than announced, or ILA) of the main diagonal (consistency between de jure and de
facto, or C).10 Obviously, conscious choice will never explain fully the observed combi-
10We consider the labels fear of floating and fear of pegging used by other authors inappropriate in
the present context. Consider fear of floating as introduced by Calvo and Reinhart (2002): it
describes the desire of a country to limit exchange rate fluctuations but it does not embrace why
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nation of the jure and de facto regimes, since policymakers will usually not take into
account all the possible future states of the world. In fact, the de jure exchange rate
regime is an ex ante stated policy intention while the de facto regime resembles the ex
post policy decisions. However, we show that there indeed are country characteristics
that systematically lead decision-makers to favor one type of deviation from consistency.
2.2.2 Explanatory variables
We use a wide set of macroeconomic, structural, institutional, and financial indicators to
identify those characteristics that are associated with regime discrepancies of a specific
kind. The complete dataset is described in table 2.3. Our choice of variables is mainly
guided by previous studies on the determinants of exchange rate regimes, as we expect
that many of the variables relevant for the choice of de jure and de facto regimes sep-
arately can also explain part of the variation in regime discrepancies. Underlying this
expectation is our view that regime discrepancies are a reflection of conflicting views and
agendas on exchange rate policies that give ambiguity a potentially constructive role.
Starting with trade-related variables, we measure the degree of openness as the sum of
exports and imports relative to GDP. The importance of primary commodity exports is
proxied by the sum of agricultural raw materials, ores, metals, and fuel exports as a share
of all merchandise exports while trade concentration is measured as the share of total
exports to the three largest trading partners. Furthermore, we include the three year
centered standard deviation of the terms of trade growth rate to measure the volatility
of an economy’s external environment.
The degree of financial market development seems to influence the choice of exchange
rate policies (Husain, Mody and Rogoff, 2005). Stages of development are captured
by two different types of country classifications: the World Bank concept of income
groups and the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI) concept of emerging
markets and developed economies. We consider the income categories of the World Bank
(low, lower middle, upper middle, and high income) based on GNI per capita the most
suitable indicator of economic development. The low and middle income countries are
countries do not announce their actual intervention strategy. Fear of pegging has been used by
Alesina and Wagner (2006) and by von Hagen and Zhou (2006) to describe a situation where the
de jure exchange rate regime is more rigid than the de facto one (what we label ILA). However,
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) have used the term to describe situations in which a country
having a de facto fixed exchange rate regime is unwilling to explicitly announce it (fear of floating
in a narrow sense).
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often referred to as developing countries. The MSCI distinguishes between developing,
emerging market, and developed economies. The separating feature of emerging market
economies (EMEs) from other developing countries is the level of market capitalization.
The MSCI differentiates between EMEs and advanced economies using a combination of
macroeconomic and financial indicators, such as GDP per capita, the extent and quality
of financial regulation and restrictions, and perceived investment and/or country risk.
Thus, starting from a threshold level of financial market development, the separating
line between the country groups is drawn based on financial sector and institutional
strength. We mainly use the World Bank groups for our analysis while controlling
for the robustness of our findings with respect to the alternative MSCI categorization.
Additionally, we use a time-varying MSCI dummy as explanatory variable, which is equal
to 1 from the year of inclusion of a country in the MSCI onwards and 0 otherwise.
Two alternative measures of financial openness are used to account for the distinction
between de facto and de jure policies.11 The degree of financial openness and the actual
integration into international financial markets are very likely to affect a country’s choice
of an exchange rate regime and of how to communicate this choice. When capital
markets are open and financial integration is high, the potential for market discipline
increases. If capital controls are in place or the capital account is open but no capital
actually flows across borders, these possibilities are limited or absent and policymakers
have additional leverage on domestic monetary policy. As de jure measure, we use the
indicator of financial openness constructed by Chinn and Ito (2006) which is based on
the intensity of official restrictions on capital account transactions as reported in the
AREAER. To capture the degree of actual financial integration, we follow Kose et al.
(2006) and construct an additional measure based on the sum of external assets and
liabilities over GDP, using the data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
In addition to variables related to trade and financial structure and openness, we assess
the role of country size (measured by population or GDP) and the level of economic
development (GDP per capita). In some of the regressions in section 2.5 year dummies
are included. We also look at regional dummies to account for the geographic clustering
found in the statistical analysis.
11For a discussion of how to measure financial openness and financial integration, see, e.g., Kose, Prasad,
Rogoff and Wei (2006).
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2.3 Time trends and joint factors
As already pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks
and Oomes (2003) the type of discrepancy between announced and de facto policy has
been subject to an important shift over time, from “labeling something as a peg when
it is not, to labeling something as floating when the degree of exchange rate flexibility
has in fact been very limited” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, p.37). However, neither of
the two publications has pursued this aspect further, so it is worthwhile to lay out some
important patterns we find in the data. Over the whole sample period (1973-2004) only
60 per cent of the total observations12 involve consistent regimes while 22 per cent are
associated with ILA and 18 per cent with IMA. However, as illustrated in figure 2.2c,
the occurrence of ILA has been decreasing over time, from 28 per cent in the 1970s to 10
per cent in the 2000s, while the frequency of observing IMA has been increasing, from 10
per cent in the 1970s to 27 per cent in the 2000s. The proportion of consistent regimes
has remained roughly constant.
It is instructive to look at the de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes accompanying
observed discrepancies. Not surprisingly, the higher the proportion of de jure fixed or
floating regimes, the higher is the potential for ILA and IMA, respectively. For the whole
sample, 47 per cent of the total observations are de jure fixed, 33 per cent intermediate,
and 20 per cent floating exchange rate regimes. However, the distribution of de facto
regimes differs substantially: only 36 per cent of all observations are associated with
fixed exchange rate regimes (11 percentage points less than de jure), 49 per cent with
intermediate (16 percentage points more), and 15 per cent with floating regimes, which
can be separated into 10 per cent of freely falling and, thus, only 5 per cent truly freely
floating regimes. Note that it is important to separate out the freely falling category,
characterized by (very) high inflation rates which lead to important distortions (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2004).13
As figure 2.2a illustrates, de jure regimes exhibited a clear trend from fixed towards
flexible regimes: fixed regimes declined from 66 per cent in the 1970s to 42 per cent in
the 2000s, while floating regimes increased from 7 per cent in the 1970s to 33 per cent
in 2000s. In contrast, the distribution of de facto regimes remained more stable (figure
12With observation we mean a country-year data point.
13The freely falling category encompasses observations when the twelve-month inflation rate is equal
to or exceeds 40 per cent per annum and, additionally, includes the first six months following an
exchange rate crisis if it marked a transition from a peg or quasi-peg to a managed or independent
float. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, p.3-4)
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2.2b). Fixed regimes decreased from 44 per cent in the 1970s to 31 per cent in the 1980s
and increased to 40 per cent in the 2000s. The floating regimes increased from 8 per
cent in the 1970s to 13 per cent in the 2000s while intermediate exchange rate regimes
remained at 40 to 50 per cent of all observations.14
Another interesting feature is that discrepancies between announced and de facto
exchange rate policies are highly persistent over time, as documented by von Hagen and
Zhou (2006). Discrepancies are not single observations that occur from time to time but
they seem to follow systematic patterns. Some countries display ILA or IMA over nearly
the whole sample period, while others moved from ILA to IMA following the overall
trend, sometimes transitioning through consistent combinations. Most of the countries
sticking to one type of discrepancies have changed their de facto and/or de jure policies
quite frequently. The transition from announcing more rigid regimes than de facto
followed towards announcing more flexible regimes has been accompanied by increased
financial liberalization and financial integration (see figure 2.3a and 2.3b). While the
years around the transition from ILA towards IMA were characterized by particularly
high world inflation rates, they decreased to extraordinary low levels afterwards (see
figure 2.3c).
2.4 Descriptive statistical analysis
2.4.1 Consistent regime combinations
Before analyzing discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate regimes it
is useful to point out some stylized facts and country characteristics which may induce
policymakers to explicitly choose consistent regime combinations. A first observation
is that the overwhelming part of consistent regimes are fixed (50 per cent), closely
followed by intermediate exchange rate regimes (39 per cent) while only 11 per cent of
the observations are related to floating regimes.
One reason for this observation is that extreme forms of fixed regimes (monetary
unions, dollarization, and currency boards) are chosen to signal the impossibility of
deviation from the announced regime. Failures to follow the announcements are imme-
14Additionally, we observe important differences in regime choices between country groups, specifically
between high, upper middle, lower middle, and low income countries. For a graphical analysis of
de facto and de jure exchange rates regimes as well as resulting discrepancies, see Bersch and Klüh
(2007).
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diately visible and the cost of exit is extremely high.15 Indeed, these regimes represent a
significant share of consistent observations.16 Extreme forms of fixed regimes are mostly
chosen by very small and open economies, such as the members of the CFA French franc
zone and the Eastern Caribbean Dollar zone, or by countries with a long history of high
inflation and crises such as Argentina and Ecuador, but also by advanced economies in
the EMU.
Among the consistent free floaters one can distinguish two main country groups. The
first group consists of countries that have experienced crises and high inflation rates
over the majority of years in the sample. These countries usually are characterized as
freely falling within the de facto classification, sometimes showing short and infrequent
events to stabilize expectations through exchange-rate based stabilization programs. The
second group consists of highly developed countries like Australia, Japan, and the United
States.
2.4.2 Intervening less than announced (ILA)
Over the whole sample the number of ILA observations is surprisingly high. Although
the occurrence of ILA clearly declined over time, still 14 per cent of all observations
are related to ILA in the 1990s and 2000s. How can this widespread phenomenon be
explained? The announcement of a rigid exchange rate regime is a means to import
credibility for tough monetary policy from the anchor country. Then, pursuing a more
flexible exchange rate policy, e.g., through frequent parity adjustments, should result in
a loss of credibility. As a consequence, any new attempt to build up credibility via a
rigid exchange rate regime will most likely prove even harder. Consequently, the existing
literature would not consider ILA to be the result of actual policy choices. Instead, it
would be considered a crisis phenomenon resulting from the actual inability of a country
to pursue the rigid policy (inability to peg).17
Before taking a closer look at the economic characteristics of the countries that have
a history of ILA, it is useful to point out two aspects of the data that in our view have
not received enough attention in related contributions. When studying the countries
identified as those operating under ILA, we were surprised about the sensitivity of the
15The exit of Argentina from its currency board arrangement in 2001/2002 started a new discussion
about the transparency and disciplining capacity of this exchange rate arrangement.
16The share is 29 per cent of the consistent regime combinations until 1999; afterwards we do not have
detailed information.
17This is also the perspective taken in Alesina and Wagner (2006).
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results with respect to (i.) the classification of some of the more rare or exotic exchange
rate regimes, specifically secret basket pegs, and (ii.) the choice of reference currencies
for cooperative systems. Not accounting for this sensitivity leads to potentially severe
measurement errors and implies an often counter-intuitive classification with respect to
the regime discrepancy.18
Turning to the characterization of countries that are mainly associated with ILA,
exploring our data allowed us to identify a number of interesting empirical regularities.
Most importantly, it is apparent from our data that ILA is not just a crisis phenomenon
or a mere inability to peg. While the de jure exchange rate regimes predominately
related to ILA are fixed regimes (77 per cent), the dominating intervention strategies
are de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes with 64 per cent of all ILA observations.
Only 33 per cent of all ILA observations were characterized as de facto freely falling.
Since the latter can be interpreted as a proxy for crises episodes and, more generally, for
the inability to implement restrictive monetary policies, crises and high inflation episodes
account for an important, but limited proportion of ILA observations.19 The view that
ILA represents an inability to stick to the announced rigid exchange rate regime is thus
only partially supported. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that such “failures”
only result in ILA if policymakers do not change their announced exchange rate regime
during the crisis. One reason for such a behavior may be some form of announcement
inertia, e.g., due to the time-consuming political process necessary to change the legal
framework.20
An important corollary to this observation is that de facto intermediate regimes are
over-represented in the ILA group, as intermediate exchange rate regimes constitute
“only” half of the de facto regime observations. Although intermediate exchange rate
regimes account for a significant proportion of intervention strategy choices, there seems
18Secret basket pegs are exchange rate regimes where the national currency is pegged to a basket of
at least two currencies based on country-specific criteria with the weights of the currencies and/or
the composition of the basket being secret and possibly variable (Ghosh et al., 2002). A detailed
discussion of the distinguishing features of intermediate regimes is provided in the appendix 2.A.1.
19Of all ILA observations 28 per cent are indeed preceded or accompanied by a currency crisis and
this proportion is higher than for IMA and consistent observations, 21 and 17 per cent, respectively.
These figures refer only to 1975-1997 due to data availability.
20As the de jure regime is reported only once a year (ex ante) to the IMF, it is sufficient that policy-
makers are unable to follow their announced policy to generate a single ILA observation. Also, an
announced change in the exchange rate regime may not be reflected in the official de jure classifica-
tion when it occurs over the year. However, if at least two consecutive years of ILA are observed,
other forces have to be in place, e.g., some form of announcement inertia. Note that only 22 ILA
observations out of 812 are neither preceded nor followed by an ILA or missing observation.
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to be a preference of not communicating such choice, and rather operate against the
benchmark of an announced peg, or announced float, as argued below. Only half of all
de facto intermediate exchange rate regime observations are actually announced, and
countries choose instead a strategy of more intervention (a fixed exchange rate regime)
in 28 per cent of the cases, resulting in ILA, or of no intervention (a floating regime),
resulting in IMA.21
A closer look at the countries predominately characterized by ILA reveals some further
interesting patterns. First, with respect to geographic distribution, low and middle in-
come countries in the Middle East and North Africa show a particularly strong tendency
of following less rigid exchange rate policies than announced, see table 2.4. The high pro-
portion of observations involving ILA in this country group is mirrored in the dominance
of ILA in OPEC countries. Controlling for the higher prevalence of de jure fixed regimes
does not qualitatively alter these results. The high incidence of ILA among Middle East-
ern and North African as well as OPEC countries raises the question of whether there
could be a potential link between the share of primary exports, in particular fuel export,
and the occurrence of ILA. While we do not want to jump to a conclusion prematurely, it
is interesting to note that primary exports belong to the group of variables for which the
data shows a significant difference in group means, medians, and distribution considering
all observations, see table 2.6. However, fuel exports show significantly different means,
medians, and distribution only for ILA observations related to de jure fixed regimes (see
table 2.6, lower panel). Moreover, countries with a large share of mineral exports seem
to follow ILA policies in most world regions. For example, a significant share of the ILA
observations in Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 25 per cent, is related to the cases
of Botswana with its dominant diamond industry and Zambia, long dominated by cop-
per. Similarly, most large mineral exporters in South America, excluding Chile, have at
least one substantial data spell characterized by ILA. Finally, Norway is among the few
European countries that show a substantial ILA spell, together with its Scandinavian
neighbors.
We performed parametric and non-parametric tests for the equality of means, medi-
ans, and distributions for several economic characteristics of countries that have ILA
observations against consistent and IMA observations. As the assumption of a normal
distribution of economic variables seems strong, the comparison of medians and dis-
21However, if an intermediate exchange rate regime is announced, the likelihood of actually observing it
is relatively high: 70 per cent of the announced intermediate regimes are consistent and, therewith,
it is the exchange rate category with the highest proportion of consistent regimes.
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tributions may provide a more meaningful picture of average performance in the two
groups than the comparison of means. For robustness, we provide all three. The results,
reported in table 2.6, suggest that variables related to inflation, trade openness, and
financial openness as well as to institutional quality do differ between the groups oper-
ating under ILA and non-ILA regime combinations, in addition to the export structure
described above. The inflation rates for ILA observations are significantly higher while
trade openness and the import share are significantly lower. Financial openness, both de
jure and de facto, and institutional quality (across different measures) are significantly
higher for non-ILA observations. Measures of economic development (GDP per capita,
in USD and PPP corrected) and economic size (GDP and population), however, show
only a weak relationship with ILA observations.
2.4.3 Intervening more than announced (IMA)
Over the whole sample period from 1973 until 2004 we observe IMA in only 18 per
cent of all observations. However, while ILA has been decreasing, the frequency of
observing IMA has been increasing over time. The literature on fear of floating started
by the seminal work of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) provides numerous explanations for
the reluctance of countries to tolerate substantial fluctuations in the exchange rate. The
most prominent reasons are significant balance-sheet effects, mostly due to high liability
dollarization, and high pass-through from exchange rates to prices.22 Nevertheless, this
literature does not offer a comprehensive justification for countries’ choices to announce
a more flexible exchange rate regime. If there are no credibility gains through the
announcement of a rigid exchange rate regime, policymaker may refrain from exchange
rate commitments altogether and, thus, retain full flexibility.23
Analyzing under which circumstances countries predominantly exhibit IMA reveals
some interesting patterns. Remarkably, the relative frequency of observing IMA differs
between country groups at different stages of economic and financial development, and
there has been an important shift over time. Over the whole sample period, advanced
economies have the highest frequency of IMA (34 per cent of the observations in the
country group) followed by EMEs with 21 per cent, see table 2.5. Developing countries
only choose IMA in 11 per cent of all cases. However, while until the beginning of
22Rationales for fear of floating are provided by Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001), Lahiri and Végh
(2001), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), and others.
23Rogoff et al. (2003) find that only countries at a low level of financial development are able to gain
low inflation credibility through the announcement of rigid exchange rate regimes.
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the 1990s IMA is nearly an exclusive phenomenon of advanced economies, it is rapidly
gaining importance in EMEs.24 Especially lower middle income countries display a high
and increasing share of IMA observations. Additionally, IMA observations are clearly
dominated by de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes, which account for 66 per cent
of the total IMA observations, with little time variation.25 Thus, de facto intermediate
regimes are over-represented in the IMA observations as they are in the ILA ones. With
respect to announcement choices, floating regimes dominate accordingly (72 per cent).
These figures suggest that IMA is in important ways related to the choice of intermedi-
ate intervention strategies. Furthermore, the level of economic and financial development
to which the difference between country groups can ultimately be pinned down seems to
matter. It is interesting to note, however, that IMA is more widespread amongst lower
middle than upper middle income countries. Among the countries showing considerable
IMA spells we can additionally identify the following two groups. (i) EMU members
prior to the adoption of the euro in 1999, and (ii) advanced economies which have well
developed financial markets and are very open, economically and financially: Switzer-
land, Canada, and New Zealand. The considerable increase of IMA as regime choice
in recent years, in particular for EMEs, suggests that worldwide economic trends such
as capital account liberalizations, increasing capital flows, and declining inflations rate
may be of importance for its explanation as discussed in section 2.3.
For a better understanding of the key macroeconomic variables related to IMA, we
look again at differences in means, medians, and distributions of central economic and
financial variables between the countries operating under IMA and those with consistent
or ILA regimes. The results are reported in table 2.7. For IMA observations, inflation
rates are significantly lower, institutional quality and financial openness significantly
higher.26 The differences in other variables are not significant across specifications.
Furthermore, conditional on having announced a flexible exchange rate regime, countries
with IMA have a significantly higher degree of trade openness and of trade concentration.
24This change comes along with the adoption of inflation targeting frameworks in EMEs which involve
the announcement of a free float. Due to the particular economic and financial situation in many
EMEs, however, they are reluctant to tolerate excessive exchange rate volatility, thus exhibiting fear
of floating and mostly also IMA. This is the subject of ongoing research. The apparently reverting
trend in 1999 is entirely due to the EU member countries adopting the euro which through a very
strict implementation of the rule-based de jure regime to fulfill the Maastricht criteria have exhibited
IMA.
25Among the de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes, crawling bands dominate with 30 per cent
of all IMA observations closely followed by managed floats (26 per cent).
26The large difference of average inflation rates conditional on having announced a flexible regime is
due to the freely falling observations in the non-IMA groups.
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For the whole sample, the degree of trade concentration and imports to GDP ratios are
lower for IMA observations. Overall, countries operating under IMA have lower primary
exports, are richer, and economically more developed while conditioning on de jure
flexible regimes does not deliver significant differences.
2.5 Econometric analysis
To give a more accurate picture of the potential links between country characteristics
and regime discrepancies, we regress indicators of regime discrepancies on a broad set
of variables using a pooled probit approach. After briefly discussing methodology and
explanatory variables, we outline the main results of our empirical exercise. We then
discuss the robustness of our results and provide an interpretation of the results.
2.5.1 Methodological considerations
Our main interest lies in explaining the choice variable y∗, defined as the desired combi-
nation of communication and intervention strategy. y∗ is a latent variable that depends
on a vector of explanatory variables x
y∗ = G(xβ) + u
where u is an error term independent of x with mean zero. Instead of the unobserved
y∗, we have data on the combination y of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes.
If the announced exchange rate regime is more rigid than the de facto regime, y equals
-1 (ILA), if the two regimes are of the same degree of flexibility, y equals 0 (consistent),
and if the announced regime is more flexible than the de facto one, y equals 1 (IMA).
Given this characterization, one way to proceed would be to use a multinomial re-
sponse model. Instead we opt for a binary approach, merging consistent and IMA (ILA)
observations as control group when analyzing ILA (IMA), and then using pooled probit
estimation techniques. One reason not to use a multinomial approach is that this would
require assuming independence of irrelevant alternatives, a condition that is unlikely to
hold in the present case. Similarly, there is no natural ordering for the three alterna-
tives, precluding the use of an ordered discrete choice model. Finally, by using a binary
specification, we make our results comparable to the related contribution of Alesina and
Wagner (2006), who also compare ILA and IMA separately against the remaining obser-
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vations.27 We do not use fixed effects estimations since many of our variables display no
or very little variation over time. Also the use of a random effects estimator appears in-
appropriate because we have a very large country sample which cannot be considered as
randomly drawn from the underlying population. Finally, we prefer to follow an explicit
binary choice model and then test our results against a linear probability model.
In addition to using the complete dataset, we create sub-samples, assessing the prob-
ability that a country chooses a certain regime combination conditional on observing
certain de facto or de jure regimes. For both IMA and ILA, we first code the endoge-
nous variable as 1 if we observe a specific discrepancy, and 0 otherwise. However, with
this approach we cannot disentangle the general incentives to announce a more fixed or
more flexible exchange rate regime. Therefore, in a second set of regressions, we will
restrict our sample to those observations involving de jure fixed (in the case of ILA) or
flexible (in the case of IMA) regimes, and then look at characteristics of countries sticking
to their announcement against those that do not. As noted above, both types of discrep-
ancies are dominated by intermediate de facto policies combined with the announcement
of corner solutions, i.e., fixed or floating exchange rate regimes. Thus, in a last set of
regressions we confine our sample to those observations involving de facto intermediate
regimes and analyze what distinguishes countries with a de jure fixed (floating) regime
from others.
As our aim is to identify a set of stylized facts, we use a broad set of potential
explanatory variables and report best regression results, both in terms of robustness
and significance. Starting from the observations in section 2.4, we focus on the degree
of trade openness, the importance of primary commodity exports, as well as measures
of price stability, financial openness, and economic and financial development.
With respect to price stability, it is worth pointing out that the inflation rate is not
only a likely determinant of exchange rate regime choices and possible deviations of de
facto from announced policies but is itself determined by the exchange rate regime.28
However, the exchange rate policy is likely to have only a lagged effect on the inflation
rate. Thus, by using the lagged yearly CPI inflation rate, the scope for endogeneity is
reduced. Furthermore, the effect of the inflation rate on exchange rate regime choices
is most likely not linear. Very high inflation rates have a different effect than moderate
27In contrast to our approach, Alesina and Wagner differentiate between degrees of distance between de
facto and de jure policies, i.e., conditional on de jure flexible regimes, de facto intermediate regimes
are treated differently than de facto fixed, and apply an ordered logit approach.
28Ghosh et al. (2002) and Kuttner and Posen (2001) study the macroeconomic effects of different
exchange rate regimes.
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rates of price increases.29 Therefore, we also include a (lagged) high inflation dummy
for observations involving inflation rates of 40 per cent or more on an annual basis.
Additionally, we include the ratio of imports to GDP to proxy the extent to which
domestic prices are exogenously determined.
In our baseline specifications, we do not include measures of institutional quality,
mainly because of the effect on sample size: Including standard measures of institu-
tional quality reduces the sample substantially and systematically since data is only
available for a sub-set of countries and only starting in 1984. However, to account for
the importance of institutional quality and the evidence provided by Alesina and Wagner
(2006), we run robustness checks, the results of which are reported below.
As pointed out above, we use two measures of financial openness: a de jure and a
de facto measure. As with inflation, regime choices may affect financial integration and
the incentives to change official restrictions on capital account transactions. On the one
hand, if a country has a floating exchange rate regime, capital restrictions should not
play a role. On the other hand, goods and capital markets dislike substantial uncer-
tainties with respect to exchange rate fluctuations. While financial openness affects a
country’s exchange rate policy choice, exchange rate policy is likely to affect actual finan-
cial integration only with some delay. Still, to mitigate potential endogeneity problems
when using measures of financial openness as explanatory variables, we lag them by one
period.
To account for important differences in the relation between regime choices and coun-
try characteristics at different stages of economic and financial development, we perform
separate regressions for each country group. It is likely that economic and financial
structure matter in different ways for countries at different stages of financial and/or
economic development. For example, the stability implications of financial and trade
openness change as domestic financial markets develop, additional liquidity, insurance,
hedging, and risk diversification services are provided, and credit constraints are relaxed.
The development of financial markets and institutions thus influences an economy’s abil-
ity to deal with and profit from international capital flows, and vice versa. A minimum
level of financial development seems to be required to attract capital flows but countries
without deep financial markets may be restricted in their capacity to absorb large capital
inflows. Furthermore, if a country has important external financial positions, it is more
sensitive to exchange rate volatility but it may suffer additional volatility if the positions
29High inflation is defined as inflation rates of 40 per cent or more per year following the definition of
the World Bank, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for the freely falling category.
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are frequently changed due to high capital flows.
2.5.2 Baseline results
The results of the pooled probit estimations for ILA and IMA for the whole sample and
separated by income groups are reported in tables 2.8 and 2.9 - 2.12, respectively.30 A
first important insight is that the separate treatment of countries at different stages of
economic and financial development is important. For example, higher terms of trade
volatility increases the probability of ILA when a de jure regime is announced but has no
significant effect otherwise when considering all countries jointly. When analyzing coun-
tries at different stages of economic development separately, either through sub-samples
or interaction terms, higher terms of trade volatility is associated with a significantly
higher probability for ILA and a lower probability for IMA for lower middle income
countries. For high income countries it reduces the likelihood of both IMA and ILA,
thus making consistent combinations more likely.
With respect to other trade-related variables, a higher degree of trade openness reduces
the probability of IMA, except for high income countries, and increases the probability
of ILA for low and lower middle income countries while reducing it for upper middle
income countries. More interestingly, higher exports of primary commodities increase
the probability of consistent regime combinations (reduces it for both IMA and ILA)
for low income countries. For lower middle income countries, however, the effect tends
towards the opposite: higher primary commodity exports increase the probability of
ILA. Conditional on a de facto intermediate exchange rate regime, upper middle income
countries tend also significantly towards ILA.
In general, high inflation makes ILA more and IMA less likely, supporting the view
that crises and inability to peg are part of the explanation. However, lower middle income
countries having de facto intermediate regimes and having experienced high inflation in
the previous year tend to be more cautious and to announce a flexible exchange rate
regime.
Turning to financial openness, a de jure more open capital account significantly reduces
the probability of ILA. Furthermore, it tends to increase the probability of IMA for all
country groups except low income countries. The evidence for de facto financial openness
is mixed, with the exception of high income countries for which a higher de facto financial
30We use the same regressors for all sets of estimations whenever possible to avoid additional selection
problems due to data availability.
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openness makes IMA significantly more and ILA less likely.
A listing in the MSCI index, a proxy for the crossing of a critical level of financial
market development, increases the likelihood of experiencing inconsistent regime com-
binations, both ILA and IMA, for lower middle income countries while reducing it for
upper middle income countries. Conditional on de facto intermediate regimes, all coun-
tries have a higher probability of announcing a more flexible exchange rate regime when
included in the MSCI. More specifically, the inclusion in the MSCI increases the prob-
ability of IMA for upper middle income countries while increasing the probability of
deviations from consistent regimes for lower middle income countries.
Furthermore, we get the following insights from the regressions conditional on spe-
cific exchange rate regime announcements. On the one hand, conditional on de jure
fixed regimes, higher terms of trade volatility, lower trade openness, and higher de facto
financial openness reduce the likelihood of ILA for high income countries. However,
lower middle income countries are more likely to have ILA when included in the MSCI
index, when they have higher primary commodity exports, and higher terms of trade
volatility. The probability of ILA is higher for low income countries when they have
lower primary commodity exports and high inflation in the previous year. On the other
hand, conditional on the announcement of a flexible exchange rate regime, higher trade
openness, lower terms of trade volatility, and higher financial openness (both de facto
and de jure) make it more likely for high income countries to operate under IMA. Upper
middle income countries are more likely to have IMA when they are not included in the
MSCI, are less open to trade, have low inflation, and higher de jure financial openness.
For lower middle income countries, higher primary commodity exports, lower terms of
trade volatility, and low inflation are positively related with IMA. Lower trade openness
and de jure financial openness makes IMA more likely for low income countries.
2.5.3 Robustness checks - sensitivity analysis
As to methodological robustness, we checked all our results with a linear probability
model and used interaction terms instead of sub-samples and the signs of the coefficients
remained unchanged. Furthermore, regressions for narrower samples, excluding small
countries with a population of less than one million and considering only a number of
economically important countries, confirmed our key results. Neither did the exclusion
of the observations since 2000 for which we construed the de jure exchange rate regimes
qualitatively alter the results. As previously discussed, freely falling observations may
28
Chapter 2. When countries do not do what they say: Systematic discrepancies between
exchange rate regime announcements and de facto policies
distort our results. However, regressions excluding these observations did not change
the main results.
Alesina and Wagner’s (2006) results suggest that institutional quality is pivotal for
explaining discrepancies between exchange rate regime announcements and de facto poli-
cies. As institutional quality data is only available for a sub-set of countries and since
1984, the sample is substantially and systematically changed. Nevertheless, we ran ro-
bustness checks including indicators of country risk (composite risk rating), bureaucratic
quality, and democratic accountability. The main insight is that better institutional qual-
ity significantly increases the likelihood of IMA while institutional quality has no effect
on the probability of ILA across different specifications. Furthermore, the signs of the
coefficients of variables related to IMA are mostly unchanged while primary commodity
exports (related to ILA) are not significantly related to regime discrepancies anymore.
This, however, is not surprising since ILA is predominantly observed during the 1970s
and 1980s for which institutional quality data is not available and which are thus not
included.
The results, however, are not very robust to the use of the de facto exchange rate
regime classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). The main reason is that
the classification differs fundamentally from Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004), the correla-
tion is only 0.5. Therefore, we consider only observations for which the two classifica-
tions coincide. This reduces the number of observations involving deviations between
announcements and de facto policies significantly.31 However, using only observations
for which Reinhart and Rogoff and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger agree in their de facto
classifications, we can broadly confirm our results. As discussed in section 2.2, we nev-
ertheless consider the Reinhart and Rogoff de facto classification the more appropriate
for our questions.
2.5.4 Interpretation of the empirical evidence
To interpret these findings, it is essential to first go back to the two fundamental in-
sights of the descriptive analysis above. First, there is a clear tendency for countries to
announce either a fixed or floating exchange rate regime. This move to the corners of
the exchange rate flexibility spectrum, however, is not mirrored in actual intervention
strategies. Countries with a higher degree of de jure financial openness and countries
31 The overall frequency of ILA and IMA is reduced from 22 to 7 per cent and from 18 to 13 per cent,
respectively.
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that cross a critical level of financial market development tend to intervene more than
announced. At the same time, higher inflation and a higher share of primary commodi-
ties make it more likely that countries allow their exchange rate to float more than
announced.
Second, the tendency towards announcing extreme exchange rate regimes goes hand
in hand with a tendency towards de facto intermediate regimes. Countries for which
an intermediate exchange rate regime is the optimal choice face the following problem.
Intermediate exchange rate regimes have the reputation of being highly vulnerable to
crises.32 Partly as a consequence, communicating intermediate regimes is complicated:
In principle, policymakers could announce the parameters that will guide day-to-day
policy decisions, for example, through publication of the threshold levels of shocks that
will trigger intervention. This, however, involves substantial communication risks since
the states of the world that would have to be specified ex ante would be too large to
be effectively displayed in a transparent manner. In addition, communicating the inter-
mediate nature of the regime would reduce its benefits substantially, since the desired
flexibility would be reduced by any attempt to formalize the intervention strategy. Fur-
thermore, there will be always situations in which the expectations created by a certain
regime announcement will be frustrated. A policymaker aware of this might want to
choose a communication framework that does not aim at preventing the impossible, but
at providing a suitable framework for explaining deviations. It may therefore be a viable
alternative to announce a floating or fixed exchange rate regime as benchmark to explain
policy deviations against a clear arrangement. Put differently, since ambiguity cannot
be avoided, the policymaker’s task is to manage it appropriately. Financial markets
and the public might not even be averse to such an approach: For markets, ambiguities
might actually represent opportunities worth exploring (Best, 2005).
The announcement of a more flexible exchange rate regime than de facto implemented
is more likely the more financially open and developed countries are. As countries
develop economically and financially, they increasingly benefit from flexible exchange
rate regimes (Rogoff et al., 2003). Advanced countries often exhibit important nominal
rigidities and rely on the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. At the
same time, they generally do not have severe currency mismatch problems as financial
32Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) find that for developed and emerging market economies more inte-
grated with international capital markets, pegged exchange rate regimes are more prone to currency
crises than floating regimes (they use the IMF de facto regimes). However, intermediate exchange
rate regimes are the most crisis prones independent of the degree of financial integration.
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instruments in their own currencies and adequate hedging instruments are available.
Nevertheless, these countries may opt to choose IMA. The announcement of a free float
may be central for signaling an advanced stage of development, while the high openness
may require intervention on a regular basis to smooth exchange rate variations.
Countries at an intermediate level of financial development often face important cur-
rency mismatches33 and are confronted with large and volatile capital inflows, making
a more active exchange rate intervention strategy more likely. At the same time, these
countries usually prefer a communication strategy that exposes the financial system’s
ability to manage exchange rate risks on its own. Doing so conveys the economy’s abil-
ity to partly absorb external shocks without policy intervention, and may thus signal a
certain degree of financial market development and a relatively resilient macroeconomic
environment. Closely related, IMA provides a tool for learning to float34 as policymak-
ers signal to financial markets the need to develop skills and instruments and, at the
same time, intervene sufficiently to support weak and not fully developed markets. In
this context, IMA may open a channel for reputation building by allowing the public to
learn about policymakers’ abilities to stabilize the exchange rate in an otherwise market-
determined system, either directly or through the stabilization of fundamentals that spill
over to the exchange rate. It may in fact be easier to stabilize the exchange rate when
the commitment to stabilization is not excessive due to the existence of escape clauses.
Drazen and Masson (1994) show that announcing an overly tough policy stance towards
exchange rate changes may force policymakers to maneuver the economy into a situation
in which subsequent exchange rate changes become more difficult to avoid. If carrying
out an announced tough policy has lasting effects on the underlying policy trade-off,
the signaling benefits of such a strategy may be outweighed by the now larger cost of
continuing to be tough.
Furthermore, middle income countries have been particularly prone to banking and
twin crises, especially with rigid exchange rate regimes, and may thus be very cautious
in providing any kind of explicit target.35 Clear exchange rate targets may not only
33Currency mismatches in the economy are a prominent explanation for countries exhibiting fear of
floating and, thus, a reluctance to let their exchange rate float freely.
34Countries have to fulfil certain criteria to be able to take fully advantage of a flexible exchange rate
regime and usually it takes time and effort to achieve critical levels. Duttagupta, Fernandez and
Karacadag (2004), Asici and Wyplosz (2003), and Hakura (2005) discuss recommendable prerequi-
sites.
35Twin crises have almost exclusively been an emerging market phenomenon (Rogoff et al., 2003).
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that twin crises typically occur in the aftermath of financial
liberalization and that the coincidence of banking and currency crises is particularly costly.
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trigger speculative attacks but also distort investment and borrowing decisions. High
capital flows combined with financial and institutional weaknesses may exacerbate these
distortions. If the perceived risk level is high, frequent and sudden reversals of capi-
tals are not unusual and may be triggered by minor events.36 However, exchange rate
fluctuations may be perceived as increasing the overall risk of a country calling for an
active exchange rate management. Thus, middle income countries may find themselves
facing a difficult policy dilemma to which IMA may provide a possible solution. Through
the announcement of a flexible exchange rate regime, countries do not provide explicit
guidance and thus no direct target for expectations. However, through active exchange
rate management they limit the detrimental effects of large exchange rate fluctuations.
An interpretation of the relation between primary commodity exports and ILA can be
found in discussions on exchange rate policies in countries characterized by a predomi-
nant export staple. On the one hand, these countries are vulnerable to large changes in
the terms of trade, which, in theory, would require the exchange rate to depreciate (appre-
ciate) after large negative (positive) shocks. On the other hand, the respective economies
face difficult trade-offs when choosing a nominal anchor other than the exchange rate.
The tension between these two policy concerns has led some observers to propose non-
standard exchange rate anchors, such as pegging the export price (Frankel, 2005).
But trading off the need for flexibility and the viability of a nominal anchor is not the
only challenge for these countries. The respective economies are also vulnerable to dutch
disease-type phenomena (Corden and Neary, 1982; van Wijnbergen, 1984)37: In order to
diversify over the medium term, policymakers may want to keep the real exchange rate
at a competitive and stable level. However, if the country is experiencing high foreign
capital inflows, e.g., due to booming primary commodity exports or large-scale remit-
tances, this may lead to a steady real appreciation which threatens the competitiveness
of other export sectors.38 A policymaker concerned about competitiveness may thus
36Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) present empirical evidence on sudden stops.
37The basic mechanism of dutch disease can be described as follows. Consider the discovery of natural
resources that leads to an export boom where foreign capital inflows increase, putting pressure on
the nominal exchange rate. Also real income rises and part of it is spend on non-traded goods. If
the exchange rate is fixed, this leads to an increase in domestic prices and, thus, to a real exchange
rate appreciation (world prices are given). In case the country has a flexible exchange rate the
capital inflows will appreciate the nominal exchange rate and, thus, the real exchange rate. The
real appreciation deteriorates the external competitiveness of the other traded good sectors in the
economy. In the extreme case, other export sectors may be crowded out completely, increasing the
country’s vulnerability to external shocks (especially to primary commodity prices).
38High domestic inflation may have the same effect.
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want to limit real appreciations by adjusting the nominal exchange rate accordingly.
This policy, however, results in an increase in foreign reserves that, if not sterilized,
increases domestic money supply and inflation.39
In many countries, the monetary challenges of such a policy are reinforced by two
factors. First, money markets in the respective countries are often underdeveloped,
limiting the effectiveness of standard approaches to monetary management. Second,
many of the large primary exporters are also heavily dependent on imports and are thus
characterized by a high pass-through from exchange rates to prices. Both factors tend
to increase the role of the exchange rate in stabilizing prices and require authorities
to provide clear signals with respect to the future level and volatility of the exchange
rate, which are also important for emerging export sectors. It may thus be necessary
to give clear guidance as to future exchange rate movements, especially in the short
term, while preserving the flexibility to restore competitiveness in the medium term.
Put differently, the exchange rate is used to communicate with two different audiences.
In specific circumstances, ILA may provide a way out of the policy dilemma. Through
the announcement of a fixed exchange rate regime the policymaker can emphasize a
willingness to maintain price stability, while using frequent parity realignments to avoid
excessive real appreciations (or depreciations).40
As an example, consider Botswana, a country that is considered by many as having
successfully avoided dutch disease in the presence of large resource exports and for which
we observe ILA since 1980.41 Botswana’s main stated policy goals are to maintain the
inflation rate at reasonable levels, to promote external competitiveness, and to success-
fully deal with external shocks (International Monetary Fund, 2004). It is interesting
to note that the first goal can, in principle, be supported by nominal exchange rate
stability while the second and third may require occasional exchange rate adjustments,
which may partly explain Botswana’s relative diversification successes.
39The monetary expansion may be limited by partial sterilization. However, the viability of sterilization
is questionable and may induce an increase in domestic interest rates, triggering further capital
inflows. A possible way out of the dilemma may be to impose temporary capital controls.
40Given that these adjustments take place frequently, maybe in small steps, e.g., to smooth variations
in the nominal exchange rate as well, the de facto exchange rate regime may be considered a rela-
tively flexible one, resulting in ILA. In this specific context, the expression ILA may be misleading
as policymakers are actually intervening more than announced although not to keep the nominal
exchange rate stable but the real one.
41According to the chronologies accompanying the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification, there was
also a parallel market 1986-1996.
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2.6 Conclusions and outlook
Our empirical analysis of discrepancies between announced and de facto exchange rate
regimes suggests that discrepancies are systematic and we identify a number of stylized
facts. Most importantly, both types of discrepancies are clearly dominated by interme-
diate de facto policies. Since countries at the same time tend to communicate exchange
rate regimes at the corners of the flexibility spectrum, inconsistencies emerge.
Whether ILA or IMA is observed depends on country characteristics. For example,
intervening less than announced is related to high shares of primary commodity exports
and low financial openness. A potential explanation is that ILA offers a way to simul-
taneously achieve short term nominal exchange rate stability while preserving medium
term flexibility. Additionally, crises situations and high inflation periods are associ-
ated with ILA. Intervening more than announced, in turn, is a widespread phenomenon
amongst countries with medium to high levels of economic and financial development and
high financial openness. IMA may provide an instrument to signal and foster financial
market development while insulating the economy from extreme financial and economic
disruptions due to high exchange rate fluctuations. Finally, we observe a significant
secular trend from ILA towards IMA which matches the movement towards financial
liberalization, the rapid development of financial markets, increasing capital mobility,
and financial integration, as well as of worldwide reductions in inflation rates.42 These
developments coincide in many aspects with the individual country characteristics re-
lated with ILA and IMA. A detailed analysis of the time trends in exchange rate regime
discrepancies is planned for future research.
Our study provides novel insights into the empirical regularities related to discrepan-
cies between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. Still, there is significant work
to be done to improve our understanding of the implementation and communication of
exchange rate policies.43 A theoretical analysis of our findings is left for future research.
Recently, countries have emphasized the benefits of bounded de facto flexibility combined
with a well-defined communication strategy and have been successful in following this
approach as inflation rates and the occurrence of crises have declined. One important
42Kose et al. (2006) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) study recent developments in financial mar-
kets.
43Recently, Reinhart and Rogoff released an update of their de facto classification for the years
2002 until 2007 and an IMF de jure classification spanning the period from 1970 until 2007, see
http://www.wam.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html. An update of our analysis is planned for the
future.
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manifestation is that the communication of explicit exchange rate targets is increasingly
being substituted by the communication of explicit inflation targets. Inflation targeting
as preferred monetary policy framework in small open economies is analyzed in the next
chapter.
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Data issues
The first example of a potentially misleading classification is related to the choice of
reference currencies. To understand the potential measurement errors resulting from
an inadequate approach, consider as an example Germany. Its de jure exchange rate
regime is classified as cooperative system, EMS or predecessor, during 1973-1998 and,
thus, as intermediate regime. However, the de facto regime is classified as freely floating
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as they use the US-Dollar, instead of a basket of the
other European currencies relative to which the announcement is made, as reference
currency. Also Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a) use the USD as reference currency
for Germany and come to the same conclusion: the exchange rate regime was a floating
one until 1998. Thus, between 1973 and 1998 Germany displays ILA, even though there
was neither unwillingness nor inability to stick to the announced policy. In fact, with
25 years of ILA Germany belongs to the small country group in which ILA has been
observed nearly throughout the sample period. To account for this problem, we drop
Germany from our sample.
A second interesting finding along these lines is that the results are very sensitive
to the classification of de jure secret basket pegs. Secret basket pegs are exchange rate
regimes where the national currency is pegged to a basket of at least two currencies based
on country-specific criteria with the weights of the currencies and/or the composition of
the basket being secret and possibly variable (Ghosh et al., 2002). When secret basket
pegs are included in the fixed exchange rate regimes as it is standard in the literature,
e.g., Ghosh et al. (2002), Alesina and Wagner (2006), and von Hagen and Zhou (2006),
the occurrence of ILA increases substantially.44 Indeed, nearly all secret basket peg
observations, i.e., 87 per cent between 1973 and 1999, are associated with intermediate
44The detailed de jure classification is only available until 1999. The share of ILA until 1999 is 24 per
cent when secret basket pegs are included in the intermediate category and 33 per cent when they
are included in the fixed regimes.
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de facto regimes. Secret basket pegs are special in the sense that, depending on policy
implementation, they can be either considered fixed or intermediate regimes. If we regard
easy verifiability of the exchange rate regime as a distinguishing feature of fixed regimes
as put forward by Frankel et al. (2001), then secret basket pegs are closer in nature
to intermediate than to fixed regimes. A basket peg may have significant variations
in the composition and relative weights of the included currencies. If, in addition, the
composition or the relative weights are not public information, as in the case of secret
basket pegs, the exchange rate regime may be very difficult or even impossible to verify
in a reasonable amount of time. Specifically, the exchange rate regime may be perceived
as intermediate without implying a diverging announcement and intervention policy.
As an interesting illustration, consider Malta, which announced a basket peg with a
secret composition until 1997 and published thereafter. During the same time, the
country followed a de facto narrow moving band (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).45 If the
composition and the relative weight of currencies in the basket change frequently without
this being public information, the exchange rate may indeed be fixed to a difficult-to-infer
central parity and appear as floating in a narrow band around some reference currency
(in the case of Malta, first the UK pound, then the DM, and finally the Euro). If we
categorize secret basket pegs as fixed, we would classify all the observations as ILA, if
we consider them as pertaining to the intermediate category, we would have consistent
regime combinations until 1997. Thus, by including the secret basket pegs into the
de jure intermediate regime category we get a more accurate picture of exchange rate
regime choices while being more conservative in favor of consistent regime combinations.
All statements in this study refer to the sample when Germany is excluded and secret
basket pegs are included in the intermediate exchange rate category.
45Malta has not been classified by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005).
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2.A.2 Graphs and tables
Table 2.1: Exchange rate regimes.
De jure exchange rate regimes, De facto exchange rate regimes,
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Dollarized No separate legal tender
Currency board Pre announced peg or currency
board arrangement
Fixed Monetary union to outside (CFA) or
inside (EMU) set of countries
Pre announced horizontal band that
is narrower than or equal to +/−2%
Single currency peg De facto peg
Published basket peg (SDR or non-
SDR)
Secret basket peg Pre announced crawling peg
Cooperative system (EMS or prede-
cessor)
Pre announced crawling band that is
narrower than or equal to +/− 2%
Crawling peg De facto crawling peg
Target zone De facto crawling band that is nar-
rower than or equal to +/− 2%
Intermediate Unclassified rule-based intervention Pre announced crawling band that
is wider than or equal to +/− 2%
Managed float with heavy interven-
tion
De facto crawling band that is nar-
rower than or equal to +/− 5%
Unclassified managed float Moving band that is narrower than
or equal to +/− 2% (i.e., allows for
both appreciation and depreciation
over time)
Other floats Managed floating
Float with light intervention Freely floating
Floating
Float with no intervention Freely falling
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Figure 2.2: Exchange rate regimes and discrepancies over time - all countries.
(a) De jure exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004.
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(b) De facto exchange rate regimes, 1973-2004.
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(c) Exchange rate regime discrepancies, 1973-2004.
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Figure 2.3: Exchange rate regime discrepancies, financial openness, and world inflation.
(a) De jure financial openness.
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(b) De facto financial openness (financial integration).
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
ILA (left axis)
IMA (left axis)
de facto financial openness (right axis)
(c) World inflation rates (per cent p.a.).
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
ILA (left axis) IMA (left axis) inflation (right axis)
39
Chapter 2. When countries do not do what they say: Systematic discrepancies between
exchange rate regime announcements and de facto policies
Table 2.2: Country coverage.
High income Upper middle income Lower middle income Low income
Australia Antigua & Barbuda Albania Benin
Austria Argentina* Algeria Burkina Faso
Belgium Botswana Armenia Burundi
Canada Chile* Azerbaijan Cameroon
Cyprus Costa Rica Belarus Central African Rep.
Denmark Czech Republic* Bolivia Chad
Finland Dominica Brazil* Cote D’Ivoire
France Equatorial Guinea Bulgaria Gambia
Greece Estonia China, P.R.* Ghana
Hong Kong Gabon Colombia* Guinea
Iceland Grenada Dominican Republic Guinea-Bissau
Ireland Hungary* Ecuador Haiti
Israel* Latvia Egypt* India*
Italy Lebanon El Salvador Kenya
Japan Libya Georgia Kyrgyz Republic
Korea* Lithuania Guatemala Lao P.D.R.
Kuwait Malaysia* Guyana Lesotho
Luxemburg Mauritius Honduras Liberia
Malta Mexico* Indonesia* Madagascar
Netherlands Panama Iran, I.R. of Malawi
New Zealand Poland* Iraq Mali
Norway Russia* Jamaica Mauritania
Portugal Slovak Republic Jordan* Moldova
Singapore South Africa* Kazakhstan Myanmar
Slovenia St.Kitts & Nevis Morocco* Nepal
Spain St.Lucia Paraguay Nicaragua
Sweden St.Vincent & Grenadines Peru* Niger
Switzerland Turkey* Philippines* Nigeria
United Kingdom Uruguay Rumania Pakistan*
United States Venezuela* Sri Lanka* Senegal
Suriname Tajikistan
Swaziland Tanzania
Syrian Arab Republic Togo
Thailand* Uganda
Tunisia Zambia
Turkmenistan Zimbabwe
Ukraine
The distinction between income groups follows the World Bank methodology which is based on GNI per capita in
USD. Countries are categorized as of their status in 2004. Low income countries are those with a GNI per capita
< 825 USD, lower middle income with 826− 3, 255 USD, upper middle income with 3, 256− 10, 065 USD and high
income countries > 10, 065 USD. Countries with a star (*) are emerging market economies as defined by the Morgan
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index.
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Table 2.3: Data sources.
Variable Source
Exchange rate regimes:
de jure Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002), AREAER (various is-
sues), information of national authorities and interna-
tional institutions
de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Eichengreen and Razo-
Garcia (2006), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)
Financial openness:
de jure Chinn and Ito (2006)
de facto Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), and authors’ calcula-
tions: (external assets + external liabilities)/GDP
Macroeconomic indicators:
CPI inflation rate International Financial Statistics
GDP per capita (in PPP) World Economic Outlook
Population International Financial Statistics
Primary commodity exports World Development Indicators and authors’ calculation
Terms of trade volatility World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations:
terms of trade growth, 3 year centered standard deviation
Trade concentration Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002); Direction of Trade Sta-
tistics
Trade openness World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations:
(exports + imports)/GDP
Currency crises Glick and Hutchison (2001)
Institutional quality The PRS Group, Inc., 1979-2006, East Syracuse, NY
13057 USA.
Regional dummies World Bank
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Table 2.4: Distribution of regime discrepancies by regions and country groups - ILA.
ILA Overall Share P(ILA|de jure
= fixed)
East Asia & Pacific* 70 221 31.7% 74.7%
Europe & Central Asia* 69 281 24.6% 35.5%
Latin America & Caribbean* 224 884 25.3% 30.1%
Middle East & North Africa* 133 314 42.4% 78.3%
South Asia* 29 118 24.6% 58.0%
Sub-Saharan Africa* 171 975 17.5% 20.4%
OECD 122 860 14.2% 47.0%
OPEC 103 248 41.5% 80.5%
Transition countries 85 323 26.3% 50.6%
Developing countries 533 2,119 25.2% 31.9%
Emerging market economies 183 738 24.8% 57.6%
Advanced countries 96 877 10.9% 40.7%
Time-varying:
Developing countries+ 667 2,530 26.4% 35.2%
Emerging market economies+ 50 363 13.8% 42.9%
Advanced countries+ 95 841 11.3% 40.4%
Low income countries 233 1,040 22.4% 27.9%
Lower middle income countries 287 952 30.1% 58.8%
Upper middle income countries 176 801 22.0% 24.4%
High income countries 116 941 12.3% 44.6%
Time-varying:
Low income countries+ 228 1,034 22.1% 30.4%
Lower middle income countries+ 305 1,222 25.0% 37.2%
Upper middle income countries+ 168 651 25.8% 38.0%
High income countries+ 111 827 13.4% 44.7%
All observations 812 3,734 21.7% 36.0%
* Only low and middle income countries are included. + The composition of these country groups
changes over time. We use the historical country classification of the World Bank since 1987 and changes
in lending categories for the preceding years to account for changes in income levels of countries over
time (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls).
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Table 2.5: Distribution of regime discrepancies by regions and country groups - IMA.
IMA Overall Share P(IMA|de jure
= floating)
East Asia & Pacific* 61 221 27.6% 75.5%
Europe & Central Asia* 54 281 19.2% 52.0%
Latin America & Caribbean* 109 884 12.3% 70.5%
Middle East & North Africa* 39 314 12.4% 72.7%
South Asia* 21 118 17.8% 100.0%
Sub-Saharan Africa* 95 975 9.7% 58.4%
OECD 305 860 35.5% 68.6%
OPEC 10 248 4.0% 36.4%
Transition countries 62 323 19.2% 56.4%
Developing countries 230 2,119 10.9% 63.5%
Emerging market economies 152 738 20.6% 62.6%
Advanced countries 294 877 33.5% 71.0%
Time-varying:
Developing countries+ 272 2,530 10.8% 62.3%
Emerging market economies+ 126 363 34.7% 66.4%
Advanced countries+ 278 841 33.1% 70.8%
Low income countries 113 1,040 10.9% 58.7%
Lower middle income countries 188 952 19.7% 70.7%
Upper middle income countries 78 801 9.7% 61.9%
High income countries 297 941 31.6% 67.7%
Time-varying:
Low income countries+ 139 1,034 13.4% 58.2%
Lower middle income countries+ 190 1,222 15.5% 69.2%
Upper middle income countries+ 58 651 8.9% 67.2%
High income countries+ 289 827 34.9% 68.3%
All observations 676 3,734 18.1% 65.7%
* Only low and middle income countries are included. + The composition of these country groups
changes over time. We use the historical country classification of the World Bank since 1987 and changes
in lending categories for the preceding years to account for changes in income levels of countries over
time (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls).
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Table 2.6: ILA - tests for equality of means, medians, and distributions.
all observations Mean t-test(1) Median Mann-Whitney
ILA = 1 ILA = 0 test(2) test(3)
Macro
GDP per capita (PPP) 4271.1 6830.9 0.000 0.000 0.000
Population 35.7 36.6 0.852 0.074 0.000
CPI inflation 107.5 23.0 0.002 0.000 0.000
Trade regime
Openness 0.6 0.9 0.000 0.000 0.000
Trade concentration 52.1 52.9 0.275 0.289 0.193
Imports to GDP 0.3 0.5 0.000 0.000 0.000
Primary exports 34.7 25.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fuel exports 20.3 11.9 0.000 1.000 0.033
Institutions
Bureaucratic quality 1.8 2.4 0.000 0.000 0.000
Accountability 3.3 4.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Country risk 58.1 67.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial openness
De jure -0.9 0.3 0.000 0.000 0.000
De facto 1.0 2.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
conditional on de jure Mean t-test(1) Median Mann-Whitney
fixed regime ILA = 1 ILA = 0 test(2) test(3)
Macro
GDP per capita (PPP) 4374.4 4859.3 0.122 0.000 0.197
Population 36.7 14.5 0.000 0.000 0.000
CPI inflation 102.8 12.1 0.010 0.000 0.000
Trade regime
Openness 0.6 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Trade concentration 53.6 59.2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Imports to GDP 0.3 0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
Primary exports 37.6 27.8 0.000 0.372 0.000
Fuel exports 22.7 9.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
Institutions
Bureaucratic quality 1.8 2.1 0.001 0.000 0.000
Accountability 3.2 3.6 0.002 0.003 0.002
Country risk 59.0 66.2 0.000 0.048 0.000
Financial openness
De jure -0.9 0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000
De facto 1.1 3.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: (1) The p-values are reported for the two means being different. The groups are not assumed
to have equal variance. (2) The p-values are reported for the nonparametric test on the equality of
medians testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being drawn from populations with the same
median. The test chi-squared statistic is continuity corrected. (3) Nonparametric test on the equality
of distributions testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being drawn from populations with equal
distribution. The p-values are reported for two-tailed tests and corrected for ties.
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Table 2.7: IMA - tests for equality of means, medians, and distributions.
all observations Mean t-test(1) Median Mann-Whitney
IMA = 1 IMA = 0 test(2) test(3)
Macro
GDP per capita (PPP) 9883.5 5478.5 0.000 0.000 0.000
Population 56.5 31.9 0.001 0.000 0.000
CPI inflation 9.5 47.5 0.000 0.000 0.000
Trade regime
Openness 0.71 0.83 0.000 0.149 0.040
Trade concentration 50.8 53.1 0.007 0.001 0.001
Imports to GDP 0.37 0.45 0.000 0.004 0.003
Primary exports 20.0 29.3 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fuel exports 7.8 15.1 0.000 0.577 0.153
Institutions
Bureaucratic quality 2.7 2.1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Accountability 4.5 3.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
Country risk 71.4 64.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial openness
De jure 0.94 -0.18 0.000 0.000 0.000
De facto 1.76 1.73 0.884 0.000 0.000
conditional on de jure Mean t-test(1) Median Mann-Whitney
flexible regime IMA = 1 IMA = 0 test(2) test(3)
Macro
GDP per capita (PPP) 8538.1 8681.6 0.830 0.585 0.430
Population 52.3 60.9 0.328 0.163 0.001
CPI inflation 9.4 143.0 0.003 0.000 0.000
Trade regime
Openness 0.71 0.62 0.006 0.073 0.000
Trade concentration 52.1 47.4 0.001 0.000 0.012
Imports to GDP 0.38 0.34 0.022 0.483 0.001
Primary exports 20.6 25.1 0.028 0.234 0.145
Fuel exports 6.9 8.2 0.276 0.122 0.015
Institutions
Bureaucratic quality 2.5 2.2 0.007 0.031 0.006
Accountability 4.4 4.1 0.055 0.054 0.071
Country risk 69.2 64.3 0.000 0.001 0.000
Financial openness
De jure 0.93 0.68 0.063 0.031 0.039
De facto 1.72 1.28 0.000 0.076 0.000
Notes: (1) The p-values are reported for the two means being different. The groups are not assumed
to have equal variance. (2) The p-values are reported for the nonparametric test on the equality of
medians testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being drawn from populations with the same
median. The test chi-squared statistic is continuity corrected. (3) Nonparametric test on the equality
of distributions testing the null hypothesis of the two samples being drawn from populations with equal
distribution. The p-values are reported for two-tailed tests and corrected for ties.
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Chapter 3
Inflation targeting in small open economies
3.1 Introduction
Many emerging and developing countries have moved away from fixed exchange rates
towards a more independent monetary policy in recent years, mostly towards inflation
targeting. Thus, open economy aspects have become increasingly important in analyzing
monetary policy. The literature frequently resorts to two simple concepts in international
economics, purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity, to describe the
relation between prices, interest rates, and exchange rates between countries. Although
the empirical relevance of these two concepts is subject to an ongoing debate, they are
frequently used in theoretical models. The present study examines the implications of
these concepts on the implementation of monetary policy.
Monetary policy is analyzed in an open economy version of the standard New Key-
nesian framework described by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999). More specifically,
flexible inflation targeting as characterized by Svensson (2007) is the monetary policy
under scrutiny. A central bank operating under flexible inflation targeting is not only
concerned about stabilizing the inflation rate around the target but additionally about
stabilizing the real economy. According to Svensson (2007) “all real world inflation tar-
geting is flexible”. Most theoretical work building on the New Keynesian model resorts to
purchasing power parity and/or uncovered interest rate parity to describe international
goods and capital markets, respectively. Purchasing power parity is based on the idea
that international goods arbitrage keeps the relative purchasing power of two currencies
constant over time. However, purchasing power parity frequently fails empirically, es-
pecially in the short-run; an overview of the evidence and explanations is provided by
Taylor and Taylor (2004). Uncovered interest rate parity is derived from arbitrage in
international financial markets according to which the nominal exchange rate adjusts to
interest rate differentials. As the underlying assumption of risk neutral investors may
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be too restrictive, in general, a time-varying risk premium is included. Still, uncovered
interest rate parity is frequently rejected in empirical studies, for an overview see Froot
and Thaler (1990) and McCallum (1994).
Notwithstanding their empirical weakness, purchasing power parity and/ or uncovered
interest rate parity are frequently used as concepts in monetary policy analysis in open
economies. The present study contributes to the literature by analyzing in a unified
framework how these two concepts and possible alternatives used in the literature affect
monetary policy. More specifically, the implications for the interest rate reaction func-
tion describing monetary policy responses to shocks under flexible inflation targeting
are examined. Thereby, useful insights into the consequences of using the simple but
empirically problematic concepts of purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate
parity in monetary policy analysis are provided.
The main insight is that the interest rate reaction function is affected when purchasing
power parity and uncovered interest rate parity are relaxed. As long as purchasing power
parity holds, monetary policy reacts only to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks.
If, however, purchasing power parity does not hold, monetary policy also fully offsets the
effects of foreign shocks. Furthermore, not the direction but the strength of the interest
rate response to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks is affected. Whether the
relation between interest rates and exchange rates is described by uncovered interest
rate parity or in the more generic way proposed by Ball (1999) does affect both to which
type of shocks monetary policy responds and how strong the response is.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview
of the related literature and stylized facts. In section 3.3 the theoretical model is devel-
oped. Then, in section 3.4 the interest rate reaction functions are analyzed for the basic
model and for hybrid models allowing deviations from purchasing power parity and un-
covered interest rate parity. First, in 3.4.1 the optimality condition for monetary policy
and the interest rate reaction function are derived for the basic model which assumes
that both purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity hold. Then, in
3.4.2 purchasing power parity is relaxed while 3.4.3 studies the implications of addition-
ally relaxing uncovered interest rate parity. The case that purchasing power parity holds
while uncovered interest rate parity does not, is briefly discussed within the basic model.
Section 3.5 discusses the main results and section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Literature review and stylized facts
Most central banks declare price stability as the primary or one of the main policy
goals; additional goals being to minimize the volatility of other economic variables such
as output and exchange rates, to smooth interest rate changes, to act as Lender of
Last Resort, and recently also to perform a supervisory role. In recent years, inflation
targeting has attracted considerable attention as a framework to pursue price stability
objectives and has been adopted also in many emerging and developing countries.1 How-
ever, no unanimity has been achieved about what inflation targeting exactly is. Widely
accepted characteristics of an inflation targeting framework are (i.) the announcement
of a numerical inflation target or target range as primary monetary policy objective,
with increasingly explicit concerns beyond the stability of inflation, mostly about the
stability of the real economy, and (ii.) a high degree of transparency and accountability
of the central bank, generally through the regular publication of inflation reports, policy
decisions, etc., see, e.g., Svensson (2007), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), and McCallum
(2003).
The standard welfare analytic framework for monetary policy is due to Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) and is also used to study inflation target-
ing. The policymaker minimizes the losses from inflation and output variability around
target rates in an intertemporal setting in which output can be increased through un-
expected inflation. When the policymaker aims at an output above the natural level,
incentives to create surprise inflation are present. However, private agents are aware of
the time-inconsistency in policymaking and internalize it in setting wages, leading to
higher inflation without output gains, the so-called inflation bias. Several suggestions
have been made on how to improve upon this discretionary outcome: reputation build-
ing, delegation, timeless perspective, escape clauses, etc. Inflation targeting seems to
be another possibility even though the literature disagrees on what inflation targeting is
exactly in this framework.
Svensson (2007) distinguishes strict and flexible inflation targeting. A central bank
operating under strict inflation targeting is only concerned about stabilizing the inflation
1The following developing and emerging market economies have adopted inflation targeting; the year
of adoption is reported in parenthesis: Brazil (1999), Chile (1991), Colombia (1999), Czech Republic
(1998), Ghana (2007), Hungary (2001), Indonesia (2005), Israel (1992), Korea (1998), Mexico (1999),
Peru (1994), Philippines (2002), Poland (1998), Rumania (2005), South Africa (2000), Thailand
(2000), and Turkey (2006). (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella
(2003); Roger and Stone (2005); web-pages of the International Monetary Fund and Central Banks)
53
Chapter 3. Inflation targeting in small open economies
rate around the target while a central bank operating under flexible inflation targeting
is additionally concerned about stabilizing the real economy. Strict inflation targeting
is considered a theoretical benchmark while central banks practically implement flexible
inflation targeting. Additionally, Svensson (1999) argues that the recognition that mon-
etary policy cannot systematically affect capacity output, the natural-rate hypothesis,
can be considered one of the foundations of inflation targeting. Therewith, Svensson
justifies the assumption that a central bank operating under flexible inflation targeting
has an implicit output target equal to the natural output level. As a consequence, no
inflation bias arises. Furthermore, the high degree of transparency and accountability
peculiar to inflation targeting creates appropriate incentives for the central bank not
to deviate from the assigned objective function. Consequently, Svensson (2007) models
flexible inflation targeting through the standard loss function over inflation and output
gap variability with a zero output gap target. Whether a central bank then implements
the commitment solution or the discretionary solution, depends on the ability and the
willingness of a central bank to commit to future policies. Even a central bank not aim-
ing at an output level above the natural rate, can gain from committing to a monetary
policy rule, eliminating the so-called stabilization bias as shown by, e.g., Clarida et al.
(1999). The stabilization bias arises when a central bank unable to precommit to a pol-
icy rule cannot respond gradually to shocks by influencing private sector expectations,
see, e.g., Dennis and Söderström (2006). The present study follows Svensson’s (2007)
approach and assumes that the central bank optimizes under discretion although the
adequateness of this approach may be questioned. Alternative perspectives on inflation
targeting are exposed by, e.g., Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), McCallum (2000), and
King (1997); Kuttner and Posen (1999) provide additional interpretations.
The present study takes flexible inflation targeting as given and does not discuss
its optimality as a monetary policy framework for small open economies. Instead, the
implementation through an interest rate reaction function is analyzed. Interest rate
reaction functions relate the monetary policy instrument, in general a short-term interest
rate, to predetermined variables and exogenous shocks. They are a valuable tool to
theoretically analyze monetary policy responses although their practical value may be
limited as shocks are difficult to identify. For practical purposes, interest rate reaction
functions are in general transformed into Taylor-type rules relating the policy interest
rate to observables such as output and inflation; a discussion of Taylor-type rules is
provided by Kozicki (1999). The interest of the present study centers around the role of
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the concepts of purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity for the interest
rate reaction function describing the implementation of flexible inflation targeting in
small open economies.
Purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity relate to two of the six
major puzzles in international macroeconomics, the purchasing power parity puzzle and
the exchange rate disconnect puzzle of which the forward premium puzzle is a manifes-
tation (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). Purchasing power parity states that the percentage
change of the nominal exchange rate between two currencies should just offset the infla-
tion differential between these countries, thus keeping the relative purchasing power of
the two currencies constant. The basic idea is that international goods arbitrage leads
to the equalization of the prices of tradable goods. Empirically, it seems to be relevant
only as a long-run concept, for an overview see, e.g., Taylor and Taylor (2004). The
purchasing power parity puzzle in this context refers to the surprisingly weak empirical
connection between exchange rates and national price levels (Rogoff, 1996). Reasons for
the empirical failure of purchasing power parity holding in the short-run are, for exam-
ple, sticky prices combined with highly volatile nominal exchange rates as in Dornbusch’s
(1976) overshooting model and differences in productivity growth between countries as
captured in the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Uncovered interest rate parity is derived from arbitrage in international financial mar-
kets and states that the expected percentage change in the nominal exchange rate should
equal the interest rate differential. As the underlying assumptions of risk neutral in-
vestors and no country specific risk may be too restrictive, in general, a time-varying
risk premium is included. Despite this, uncovered interest rate parity is frequently re-
jected in empirical studies; an overview is provided by Froot and Thaler (1990) and
McCallum (1994). In this context, the exchange rate disconnect puzzle describes the
more general, weak relation between the exchange rate and virtually any macroeconomic
variable. The related forward premium puzzle states that the forward premium incor-
rectly predicts the direction of future changes in the exchange rate, implying a rejection
of uncovered interest rate parity, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and McCallum (1994).
Abstracting from rational expectations or assuming that the time-varying risk premium
is negatively correlated with an expected depreciation may explain the empirical facts,
see Froot and Thaler (1990). McCallum (1994) explains the apparent empirical failure
of uncovered interest rate parity with the hypothesis that central banks systematically
manage interest rate differentials to avoid frequent changes in the exchange rate.
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Even though their empirical validity may be questioned, purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity are such neat concepts that they are frequently used for
monetary policy analysis. The aim of the present study is to theoretically analyze how
the implementation of flexible inflation targeting in small open economies is affected by
the assumption of purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity holding
or not. The implementation of monetary policy is described by interest rate reaction
functions that relate the monetary policy instrument, the nominal interest rate, to pre-
determined variables and shocks.
The theoretical model exposed in the following section combines the standard New
Keynesian monetary policy framework by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), which is
augmented to include open economy aspects, with the inflation targeting framework
proposed by Svensson (2007). The description of aggregate demand and the price ad-
justment mechanism follows Clarida et al. (1999). To take into account open economy
aspects, an exchange rate channel is introduced. Real exchange rate depreciations raise
aggregate demand as the relative price between domestic and foreign goods changes
and, hence, the domestic and foreign demand for domestic goods. This is included in
the standard fashion of the Mundell-Fleming model by adding an exchange rate term in
aggregate demand. Another special aspect of small open economies is that they are fre-
quently hit by external shocks which have considerable effects on the domestic economy.
Therefore, shocks to foreign output and inflation as well as foreign monetary policy re-
sponses are explicitly taken into account following Svensson (2000). By allowing external
shocks to affect the domestic economy and, thus, to induce monetary policy responses,
the present study goes a step further than most of the simple monetary policy models.
The resulting theoretical framework is simple enough to analyze the implication of
purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity on the interest rate reaction
function with closed form solutions and rich enough to include essential features of small
open economies. This approach has the advantage that the implications of deviating
from the relatively standard assumptions of purchasing power parity and uncovered
interest rate parity can be analyzed in a unified open economy framework. Previous
work does not lend itself to that end as the models differs also in other aspects. Clarida,
Galí and Gertler (2001), for example, analyze monetary policy in an open economy
version of Clarida et al. (1999) while assuming that both purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity hold. In contrast, the open economy version of Clarida
et al. (1999) used by Detken and Gaspar (2003) relaxes purchasing power parity in the
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standard fashion by including an exchange rate term in the aggregate demand relation
while uncovered interest rate parity describes international financial markets. Ball (1999)
analyzes monetary policy rules while allowing for deviations from both purchasing power
parity and uncovered interest rate parity. International financial markets are instead
described by a simple proportional relation between the real interest rate and the real
exchange rate with all other effects aggregated in a random term. Ball’s (1999) approach
is used as alternative condition to uncovered interest rate parity. The model developed
by Svensson (2000) to analyze different forms of inflation targeting in a small open
economy model is too complex to obtain closed form solutions. Compared to Svensson
(2000), the present analysis simplifies on the dynamic structure by abstracting from lags
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and setting aside direct effects of
exchange rate changes on inflation in order to obtain simple analytical solutions.
3.3 Theoretical model
To analyze the interest rate reaction functions arising under flexible inflation targeting
in small open economies, the standard monetary policy model of Clarida et al. (1999) is
augmented to include open economy aspects. Furthermore, inflation targeting is charac-
terized following Svensson (2007) and foreign monetary policy following Svensson (2000).
The resulting model is simple enough to analyze the implications of purchasing power
parity and uncovered interest rate parity on the interest rate reaction function with closed
form solutions and rich enough to include essential features of small open economies.
Monetary policy objective
The central bank operates under flexible inflation targeting which is characterized fol-
lowing Svensson (2007), i.e., the central bank minimizes deviations of the inflation rate pi
from its target (normalized to zero) and deviations of output y from its natural rate yn,
thus targeting a zero output gap. When flexible inflation targeting is implemented, the
central bank is not only concerned about stabilizing inflation around the target as would
be the case for strict inflation targeting, but is additionally concerned about stabilizing
real economic fluctuations as captured by the output gap. No average inflation bias
arises because the implicit output target is the natural output level. Svensson (1999)
argues that the natural-rate hypothesis, the perception that monetary policy cannot sys-
tematically affect capacity output, can be considered one of the foundations of inflation
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targeting and, thus, justifies the assumption of a zero output gap target. Furthermore,
the high degree of transparency and accountability peculiar to inflation targeting cre-
ates appropriate incentives for the central bank not to deviate. The resulting standard
intertemporal loss function is
L = Et
{ ∞∑
n=0
βn
[
pi2t+n + αx
2
t+n
]}
(3.1)
β is the discount factor, pit the inflation rate, and xt the output gap, xt ≡ yt − yn, α is
the relative weight on the output stabilization objective. In the model all variables are
expressed as deviations from a deterministic long-run trend and, with the exception of
the interest rates, as natural logarithms and all parameters are defined as being positive.
Et is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t.
Aggregate demand
Aggregate demand expressed in terms of the output gap is characterized by equation (3.2)
and depends negatively on the real interest rate, it −Etpit+1, positively on the expected
future output gap and log-deviations of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium level,
qt.
xt = −ϕ[it − Etpit+1] + Etxt+1 + νqt + gt (3.2)
gt is an excess-demand shock described by
gt = µgt−1 + gˆt (3.3)
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and gˆt is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variance σ2g .
The basic aggregate demand equation for a closed economy (with ν = 0) can be obtained
by log-linearization of the consumption Euler equation from household’s intertemporal
optimization, see Clarida et al. (1999). The expected future output gap raises the
present output gap as a consequence of the consumption smoothing objective while
the negative effect of the real interest rate arises due to the intertemporal substitution
of consumption. The excess-demand shock captures expected changes in government
spending and in potential output.
A special aspect of open economies is that changes in the real exchange rate affect
aggregate demand. Real exchange rate depreciations raise aggregate demand as the
relative price between domestic and foreign goods changes and, hence, the domestic and
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foreign demand for domestic goods. This is included in the standard fashion of the
Mundell-Fleming model. Exchange rate depreciations are assumed to be expansionary.
However, that is not necessarily the case as illustrated by the J-curve effect and discussed
by, e.g., Sánchez (2005). If purchasing power parity holds, however, the log-deviation
of the real exchange rate from the steady-state is zero. Hence, the aggregate demand
equation for an open economy simplifies to:
xt = −ϕ[it − Etpit+1] + Etxt+1 + gt (3.2’)
The real exchange rate qt is defined as
qt ≡ et + p∗t − pt (3.4)
where et is the nominal exchange rate defined as domestic price of foreign currency and
p∗t the log of foreign prices. An increase in qt corresponds to a real depreciation.
Price adjustment mechanism
The price adjustment mechanism in the economy is described by an expectations aug-
mented Phillips-curve:
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut (3.5)
Inflation depends on the current output gap, expected future inflation, and the cost-push
shock ut described by
ut = γut−1 + uˆt (3.6)
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and uˆt being an i.i.d. random term with mean zero and variance σ2u.
This Phillips-curve specification can be derived from staggered price setting as developed
by Calvo (1983) and used by Clarida et al. (1999). Forward iteration of (3.5) reveals
that present inflation depends on current and expected future economic conditions as
captured by output gaps and cost-push shocks. Price setting decisions of firms are based
on expected changes in marginal costs. Those related to variations in excess demand
are captured through the expected future output gaps (xt+n) while the cost-push shocks
(ut+n) capture everything else affecting marginal costs, see Clarida et al. (1999). The
cost-push shock introduces a short-run trade-off between inflation and output.
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International goods and financial markets
Purchasing power parity describes the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate to the
inflation differential such as to keep the relative purchasing power of the currencies
constant:
et − et−1 = pit − pi∗t (3.7)
International financial markets are described by uncovered interest rate parity includ-
ing a time-varying risk premium ρt:
it = i
∗
t + Etet+1 − et + ρt (3.8)
where it is the domestic nominal interest rate, i∗t the foreign nominal interest rate, and,
following Svensson (2000), the risk premium is characterized by
ρt = ηρt−1 + ρˆt (3.9)
with 0 ≤ η < 1 and ρˆt being an i.i.d. random term with mean zero and variance σ2ρ.
Expectations are a crucial element in forward-looking models and the process driving
their formation may affect the results, see, e.g., the discussion by Taylor (2002). Follow-
ing most of the literature, expectations are assumed to be formed rationally.
Foreign shocks
Small open economies are frequently hit by external shocks and their effect on the do-
mestic economies is considerable. Therefore, shocks to foreign output and inflation as
well as foreign monetary policy responses are explicitly taken into account. By allowing
external shocks to affect the domestic economy and, thus, to induce monetary policy
responses, the present study goes a step further than most of the related literature.
Following Svensson (2000) the foreign inflation rate and foreign output are assumed
to follow stationary univariate AR (1) processes,
pi∗t = ρ
∗
pipi
∗
t−1 + η
∗
t (3.10)
y∗t = ρ
∗
yy
∗
t−1 + ξ
∗
t (3.11)
where 0 ≤ ρ∗pi, ρ∗y < 1 and η∗t and ξ∗t are i.i.d. random shocks with zero mean and
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variances σ2pi∗ and σ2y∗ , respectively. Furthermore, the foreign interest rate is assumed to
follow a Taylor-type rule as described by Svensson (2000):
i∗t = f
∗
pipi
∗
t + f
∗
y y
∗
t + 
∗
t (3.12)
with f ∗pi , f∗y being positive and ∗t an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance σ2∗ .
These relations describe the economy in a sufficiently simple way to analyze the im-
plementation of monetary policy and the implications of purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity with closed form solutions. By abstracting from lags in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and a direct effect of exchange rate changes
on inflation included by Svensson (2000), a tractable model is obtained.
3.4 Implementing flexible inflation targeting
Based on the model exposed in the preceding section, the implementation of flexible
inflation targeting as described by an interest rate reaction function is studied. First, in
section 3.4.1 the optimality condition for monetary policy and the interest rate reaction
function are derived in a basic model assuming that both purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity hold. As purchasing power parity and uncovered inter-
est rate parity may not hold empirically, the consequences of allowing for deviations
from these conditions are then studied in the following sections. In section 3.4.2 the
implications of relaxing purchasing power parity are analyzed. Then, uncovered interest
rate parity is additionally relaxed in section 3.4.3. The case of purchasing power parity
holding while uncovered interest rate parity does not, affects the basic model only with
respect to the determination of the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, it is not analyzed
explicitly but only briefly discussed within the basic model. The interest rate reaction
functions derived under these alternatives are then compared in section 3.5.
3.4.1 Basic model
In the basic model purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity are as-
sumed to hold both.
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Optimality condition for monetary policy
The monetary policy framework under consideration is flexible inflation targeting which
is described following Svensson (2007). By operating under flexible inflation targeting,
the central bank is assigned the loss function (3.1) which implies the absence of an in-
flation bias because of a zero output gap target. The central bank is assumed to be
unable to commit to a state-contingent rule and, thus, central bank’s behavior is charac-
terized as optimization under discretion without being able to systematically influence
expectations.2 Hence, the central bank minimizes the loss function (3.1) subject to
the Phillips-curve (3.5) for given, rational expectations. Thus, following Clarida et al.
(1999), possible reputational (sunspot) equilibria are ignored and attention is restricted
to Markov perfect equilibria, thereby circumventing the possible indeterminacy problem.
The resulting optimization problem is identical to the optimal monetary policy under
discretion in Clarida et al. (1999) for a closed economy and is solved accordingly. As
there are no endogenous state variables, the minimization problem simplifies to a se-
quence of static optimization problems. The central bank chooses inflation and output
each period such as to minimize
pi2t + αx
2
t + Ft
subject to
pit = λxt +Ht
where Ft ≡ Et
{∑∞
n=1 β
n
[
pi2t+n + αx
2
t+n
]}
and Ht ≡ βEtpit+1 + ut are taken as given.
This implies both that the central bank cannot manipulate expectations and that future
output and inflation are independent of present policy actions. The resulting optimality
condition is:
xt = −λ
α
pit (3.13)
To represent inflation and output as functions of the state variable ut, iterate (3.5)
forward using the first order condition (3.13) and the assumption of rational expectations
for private agents, see Clarida et al. (1999):
pit =
α
α(1− βγ) + λ2ut (3.14)
2For developing and emerging market economies who have just adopted inflation targeting and lack
both the experience of independent monetary policy and the credibility for low inflation policy, a
discretionary solution does not seem unreasonable. For a discussion see also Svensson (2007).
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xt = − λ
α(1− βγ) + λ2ut (3.15)
Interest rate reaction function
The interest rate reaction function to implement the monetary policy is derived inserting
the optimality condition (3.13) into aggregate demand (3.2’) and solving for the nominal
interest rate:
it =
αγϕ+ λ(1− γ)
ϕ{α(1− βγ) + λ2}ut +
1
ϕ
gt (3.16)
Flexible inflation targeting implies that excess-demand shocks are perfectly offset by
monetary policy while cost-push shocks affect both inflation and output. Excess-demand
shocks increase output and thus inflation, and an increase in the nominal interest rate
can reverse both effects completely. However, the increase in inflation following a cost-
push shock can only be counteracted when output is reduced below its natural level,
thus forcing a trade-off between inflation and output. To minimize the loss function,
an increase in inflation and a reduction in output are optimal such that the loss from a
marginal increase in inflation equals the loss from a marginal decrease in output. The
strength of the trade-off depends on the direct effect of output on inflation, λ, and the
relative importance of the stabilization objective, α.
The assumption of uncovered interest rate parity is not necessary to derive the interest
rate reaction function as long as purchasing power parity holds and is only relevant for
the determination of the nominal exchange rate. Hence, allowing for deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity while purchasing power parity holds does not affect the
interest rate reaction function and is therefore not analyzed explicitly.
The optimality condition (3.13) is independent of the assumptions of purchasing power
parity and uncovered interest rate parity as they do not affect the loss function (3.1) or
the Phillips-curve (3.5). Therefore, only the implications on the interest rate reaction
functions resulting from these assumptions are analyzed in the next sections.
3.4.2 Relaxing purchasing power parity
The basic model is very stylized and not qualitatively different from a closed economy
model due to the strong assumption of purchasing power parity. However, purchasing
power parity has been shown to hold empirically only in the long-run, e.g. Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000). As the Phillips-curve is a predominantly short-term concept, purchasing
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power parity is unlikely to hold simultaneously. Therefore, the implications of relaxing
purchasing power parity are analyzed by deriving the modified interest rate reaction
function.
When purchasing power parity does not hold, changes in the real exchange rate affect
aggregate demand. Therefore, the interest rate reaction function, obtained by inserting
the reduced form representations of inflation (3.14) and output (3.15) derived from the
optimality condition (3.13) into the aggregate demand equation (3.2), now depends on
the nominal exchange rate:
it =
(1− γ)λ+ αγϕ− να
ϕ[α(1− βγ) + λ2] ut +
ν
ϕ
(et + p
∗
t − pt−1) +
1
ϕ
gt (3.17)
The interest rate and exchange rate are simultaneously determined and the interest rate
reaction function (3.17) and uncovered interest rate parity (3.8) describe their relation.
The simultaneous equation system is solved using the Minimal State Variable criterion
proposed by McCallum (1983) based on the method of undetermined coefficients. Ac-
cordingly, the solutions for the interest rate and the exchange rate are guessed to be linear
functions of the state variables (ut, gt, ρt, p∗t , p∗t−1, ∗t , y∗t , pt−1). The guessed solutions are
inserted into the interest rate reaction function (3.17) and into uncovered interest rate
parity (3.8) taking into account the foreign monetary policy rule (3.12). By matching
the coefficients of all state variables, the unknown coefficients can be solved for. When
the obtained coefficients are plugged into the guessed solutions, the following interest
rate reaction function is obtained (for a detailed analysis see appendix 3.A):
it =
αγ[ν + ϕ(1− γ)] + (1− γ)2λ
[ν + ϕ(1− γ)][α(1− βγ) + λ2]ut +
1− µ
ν + (1− µ)ϕgt (3.18)
+
ν
ν + (1− η)ϕρt +
νf ∗y
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗y)
y∗t +
ν(f ∗pi − ρ∗pi)
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
pi∗t +
ν
ν + ϕ
∗t
Thus, optimal monetary policy reacts not only to domestic but also to foreign shocks.
More specifically, shocks to the risk premium ρ, foreign output y∗, foreign inflation pi∗,
and shocks to the foreign monetary policy rule ∗ are perfectly offset.
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3.4.3 Relaxing purchasing power parity and uncovered interest
rate parity
The assumption of uncovered interest rate parity has no implications for the interest
rate reaction function as long as purchasing power parity holds; the corresponding com-
bination is therefore not analyzed explicitly. However, when purchasing power parity
is relaxed, uncovered interest rate parity becomes important. While uncovered interest
rate parity has some empirical justification, it suffers from considerable shortcomings
(forward premium puzzle, etc.). Therefore, a more generic approach to describe the
relation between interest rates and exchange rates may be useful. Ball (1999) proposes
and applies a very simple approach that just describes the real exchange rate as being
proportional to the real interest rate and a random term ρ˜t:
qt = −θ(it − Etpit+1) + ρ˜t (3.19)
The idea is that an interest rate increase makes domestic assets more attractive leading
to an appreciation of the exchange rate. Furthermore, the term ρ˜t captures everything
else affecting the real exchange rate like expectations, foreign interest rates, etc. There is
a broad literature describing behavior on international financial markets and the deter-
mination of exchange rates which may be used as alternatives to uncovered interest rate
parity. However, due to its simplicity, Ball’s (1999) approach is an attractive alternative
and by describing a purely contemporaneous relation between exchange rate and interest
rate, the forward premium puzzle is avoided.3 For comparability, the random term is
described by
ρ˜t = η˜ρ˜t−1 + ˜t (3.20)
with 0 ≤ η˜ < 1 and ˜t being an i.i.d. random term with mean zero and variance σ2ρ˜.
In order to facilitate the comparison, uncovered interest rate parity (3.8) can be rewrit-
ten in terms of the real exchange rate:
qt = −(it − Etpit+1) + Etqt+1 + i∗t − Etpi∗t+1 + ρt (3.8’)
The comparison with equation (3.19) reveals that the two conditions are the same if
3This feature is at the same time also an obvious flaw of the condition (3.19). As all variables affecting
the real exchange rate other than the real domestic interest rate are collected in the random term
ρ˜, no further insights into the factors moving the random term can be gained.
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θ = 1 and ρ˜t = Etqt+1 + i∗t − Etpi∗t+1 + ρt.
The interest rate reaction function is obtained by inserting the optimality condition
(3.13) into the aggregate demand equation (3.2) and again depends on the nominal
exchange rate, see equation (3.17). Now, the interest rate and exchange rate are simul-
taneously determined by (3.17) and (3.19). However, due to the absence of the expected
future exchange rate in the interest rate condition of Ball (3.19), the interest rate reac-
tion function can be derived easily by plugging equation (3.19) into equation (3.2) taking
into account (3.13) and solving for the nominal interest rate:
it =
(1− γ)λ+ αγ(ϕ+ νθ)
[α(1− βγ) + λ2][ϕ+ νθ]ut +
1
ϕ+ νθ
gt +
ν
ϕ+ νθ
ρ˜t (3.21)
In combination with the reduced form equations for inflation and output, (3.14) and
(3.15), this interest rate reaction function shows that monetary policy fully offsets excess-
demand shocks and the shocks captured in ρ˜ while cost-push shocks are only partially
offset and affect both inflation and output.
3.5 Comparison of the results
The main insight is that the interest rate reaction function is affected when purchasing
power parity and uncovered interest rate parity are relaxed. As long as purchasing power
parity holds, optimal monetary policy reacts only to cost-push shocks and excess-demand
shocks. If, however, purchasing power parity does not hold, optimal monetary policy
also fully offsets the effects of foreign shocks. Furthermore, not the direction but the
strength of the interest rate response to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks is
affected. Table 3.1 summarizes the alternative interest rate reaction functions.
Cost-push shocks
As emphasized in the literature, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999), cost-push shocks (ut) cre-
ate a trade-off between inflation and output variability. A cost-push shock increases
inflation, and inflation can only be decreased at the expense of a reduction in output
below potential. The optimal policy reaction is to increase the interest rate such as to
balance the effect on output and inflation with the adjustment costs shared according
to the optimality condition (3.13). Whether purchasing power parity and/or uncovered
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Table 3.1: Interest rate reaction functions.
Basic model
(with PPP & UIP)
it =
αγϕ+ λ(1− γ)
ϕ [α(1− βγ) + λ2]ut +
1
ϕ
gt
With PPP &
relaxing UIP
it =
αγϕ+ λ(1− γ)
ϕ [α(1− βγ) + λ2]ut +
1
ϕ
gt
Relaxing PPP &
with UIP
it =
αγϕ+ λ(1− γ) ϕ
ϕ+ ν
1−γ
ϕ[α(1− βγ) + λ2] ut +
1
ϕ+ ν
1−µ
gt +
ν
(1− η)ϕ+ ν ρt
+
νf ∗y
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗y)
y∗t +
ν(f ∗pi − ρ∗pi)
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
pi∗t +
ν
ν + ϕ
∗t
Relaxing PPP &
UIP
it =
αγϕ+ λ(1− γ) ϕ
ϕ+νθ
ϕ [α(1− βγ) + λ2] ut +
1
ϕ+ νθ
gt +
ν
ϕ+ νθ
ρ˜t
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity; UIP = uncovered interest rate parity
interest parity hold or not, does not affect the direction but the strength of the optimal
interest rate response. When purchasing power parity does not hold, a smaller interest
rate increase is sufficient to achieve a given reduction in the output gap. The reason is
that due to the exchange rate channel, a given interest rate increase has a bigger effect
on output as the additional appreciation of the domestic currency reduces aggregate
demand further.
The optimal interest rate increase is always smaller under uncovered interest rate
parity as compared to the interest rate condition by Ball (1999), if θ < 1
1−γ . This is
fulfilled, for example, if θ = 1 and γ > 0. Then, the expected future real exchange rate
has an additional contractionary effect on aggregate demand under uncovered interest
rate parity, allowing for a lower interest rate increase. If, however, the exchange rate
appreciation following an interest rate increase under the condition of Ball is high enough,
θ > 1
1−γ , a lower interest rate increase is required than under uncovered interest rate
parity to achieve a given output gap. The interest rate condition of Ball implies that
interest rate changes only have a contemporaneous effect on the real exchange rate while
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under uncovered interest rate parity also expected future exchange rates are affected.
Excess-demand shocks
The optimal policy response to an excess-demand shock, gt > 0, is to fully offset it by
raising the interest rate. The required increase in the interest rate is lower when an
exchange rate channel is added, i.e., purchasing power parity does not hold. As the
induced appreciation of the domestic currency has an additional contractionary effect,
a lower increase in the nominal interest rate is sufficient to perfectly offset the demand
shock.
The required interest rate increase is smaller under uncovered interest rate parity than
under the interest rate condition of Ball (1999), if θ < 1
1−γ . The basic intuition is the
same as for the cost-push shock.
Foreign shocks
When monetary policy is implemented optimally according to (3.13), inflation and out-
put depend only on cost-push shocks. The interest rate is set to partially offset cost-push
shocks and to perfectly offset all other shocks.
When purchasing power parity holds, the interest rate is set independently of foreign
shocks to which only the nominal exchange rate reacts. If deviations from purchasing
power parity are allowed for while uncovered interest rate parity holds, the interest
rate is optimally increased following risk premium shocks, positive deviations of foreign
interest rates from the Taylor-type rule (∗t > 0), and increases in foreign output. These
shocks would otherwise lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate, increasing output
above potential and, thus, increasing inflation above target. An increase in foreign
inflation is offset by an increase in the domestic interest rate if the induced increase in
the foreign interest rate, according to the Taylor-type monetary policy rule, is higher
than the persistence in foreign inflation, i.e., f ∗pi > ρ∗pi. If deviations from both purchasing
power parity and uncovered interest rate parity are allowed for, monetary policy perfectly
offsets the shock ρ˜t which captures a variety of shocks, changes in expectations, etc.
The result that monetary policy reacts only to foreign shocks when purchasing power
parity does not hold is due to the underlying assumption of foreign shocks affecting
only world interest rates. A possible extension is to include foreign output in aggregate
demand: when foreign output increases, exports to the rest of the world increase and,
thus, aggregate demand.
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Further aspects
When cost-push shocks are not persistent, i.e., γ = 0, the interest rate increase following
a given shock is lower than for γ > 0 if the condition ϕα > λ is fulfilled (sufficient
but not necessary condition). Hence, the stronger the present output reacts to the real
interest rate, i.e., the higher ϕ, the more important the stabilization objective relative
to the inflation objectives, i.e., the higher α, and the lower the direct effect of output
on inflation, i.e., the lower λ, the more likely it is, that interest rate increases are higher
when cost-push shocks are persistent.
The interest rate response to excess-demand shocks is lower if the shock is persistent,
i.e., µ > 0, while it is higher for all other shocks if they are persistent as opposed to
being white noise. The interest rate increase following an increase in foreign inflation is
higher under persistence of the shock, i.e., ρ∗pi > 0, if the foreign interest rate response is
strong enough, i.e., f ∗pi > 1 +
ν
ϕ
.
If a country implements strict inflation targeting, i.e., α = 0, the interest rate is set
to keep inflation at the target rate while increasing output volatility. As to the interest
rate reaction functions, only the reaction to cost-push shocks creating a trade-off between
inflation and output is adjusted.
3.6 Conclusion
Two central concepts in international macroeconomics, purchasing power parity and un-
covered interest rate parity, are frequently used to describe open economy aspects in
monetary policy models even though their empirical relevance is controversial. As devel-
oping and emerging market economies increasingly pursue independent monetary policy,
in particular flexible inflation targeting, open economy aspects become increasingly im-
portant for monetary policy analysis. Therefore, it is important to know if the relatively
standard and simple assumptions of purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate
parity yield different policy recommendations than alternative conditions describing the
relation between prices, interest rates, and exchange rates.
The present analysis finds that the interest rate reaction function to implement flex-
ible inflation targeting is affected when deviations from purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity are allowed for. As long as purchasing power parity holds,
monetary policy reacts only to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks. If, however,
purchasing power parity does not hold, monetary policy also fully offsets the effects of
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foreign shocks. Furthermore, not the direction but the strength of the interest rate re-
sponse to cost-push shocks and excess-demand shocks is affected. Whether the relation
between interest rates and exchange rates is described by uncovered interest rate parity
or in the more generic way proposed by Ball (1999) does affect both to which type of
shocks monetary policy responds and how strong the response is.
However, the effects are mostly quantitative and the empirical relevance of the al-
ternatives used for purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity is also
not warranted. To find alternative concepts that describe the relation between prices,
interest rates, and exchange rates in an empirically relevant way while being simple, may
be the subject for future research.
The present model abstracts from a number of other important issues for small open
economies. Foreign shocks, for example, do not only affect world interest rates but also
more directly domestic output through the demand for exports. Additionally, foreign
shocks affect inflation rates in small open economies through both imported intermedi-
ate and final goods and, thus, affect both aggregate demand and potentially aggregate
supply. An extension of the present analysis to include further features of small open
economies is planned for future research.
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3.A Derivation of the interest rate reaction function
To derive the interest rate reaction function when the assumption of purchasing power
parity is relaxed, the reduced form representations of inflation (3.14) and output (3.15)
derived from the optimality condition (3.13) are inserted into the aggregate demand
equation (3.2). The resulting interest rate function depends on the nominal exchange
rate:
it =
(1− γ)λ+ αγϕ− να
ϕ[α(1− βγ) + λ2] ut +
ν
ϕ
(et + p
∗
t − pt−1) +
1
ϕ
gt (3.17)
Simultaneously, the interest rate and the exchange rate are determined by uncovered
interest rate parity (3.8) with i∗t determined by (3.12):
it = f
∗
pipi
∗
t + f
∗
y y
∗
t + 
∗
t + Etet+1 − et + ρt (3.8’)
The solutions for the interest and exchange rate are guessed to be linear functions of
the state variables (ut, gt, ρt, p∗t , p∗t−1, ∗t , y∗t , pt−1):
et = φ1ut + φ2gt + φ3ρt + φ4p
∗
t + φ5p
∗
t−1 + φ6
∗
t + φ7y
∗
t + φ8pt−1 (3.22)
it = γ1ut + γ2gt + γ3ρt + γ4p
∗
t + γ5p
∗
t−1 + γ6
∗
t + γ7y
∗
t + γ8pt−1 (3.23)
The guessed solutions are then inserted into the interest rate reaction function (3.17):
γ1ut + γ2gt + γ3ρt + γ4p
∗
t + γ5p
∗
t−1 + γ6
∗
t + γ7y
∗
t + γ8pt−1
=
ν
ϕ
[φ1ut + φ2gt + φ3ρt + φ4p
∗
t + φ5p
∗
t−1 + φ6
∗
t + φ7y
∗
t + φ8pt−1]
+
(1− γ)λ+ αγϕ− να
ϕ[α(1− βγ) + λ2] ut +
ν
ϕ
(p∗t − pt−1) +
1
ϕ
gt (3.24)
and into uncovered interest rate parity (3.8’):
γ1ut + γ2gt + γ3ρt + γ4p
∗
t + γ5p
∗
t−1 + γ6
∗
t + γ7y
∗
t + γ8pt−1
= f ∗pi(p
∗
t − p∗t−1) + f ∗y y∗t + ∗t + φ1γut + φ2µgt + φ3ηρt
+φ4[(1 + ρ
∗
pi)p
∗
t − ρ∗pip∗t−1] + φ5p∗t + φ7ρ∗yy∗t
+φ8[
α
α(1− βγ) + λ2ut + pt−1]− φ1ut − φ2gt − φ3ρt − φ4p
∗
t
−φ5p∗t−1 − φ6∗t − φ7y∗t − φ8pt−1 + ρt (3.25)
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These two equations have to hold for all values of the state variables. Matching the
coefficients of all state variables yields:
From equation (3.24): From equation (3.25):
γ1 =
(1− γ)λ+ αϕγ − αν
ϕ[α(1− βγ) + λ2] +
ν
ϕ
φ1 γ1 = φ1γ + φ8
α
α(1− βγ) + λ2 − φ1
γ2 = φ2
ν
ϕ
+
1
ϕ
γ2 = φ2µ− φ2
γ3 = φ3
ν
ϕ
γ3 = φ3η − φ3 + 1
γ4 =
ν
ϕ
(φ4 + 1) γ4 = f∗pi + φ4(1 + ρ∗pi) + φ5 − φ4
γ5 =
ν
ϕ
φ5 γ5 = −f∗pi − φ4ρ∗pi − φ5
γ6 =
ν
ϕ
φ6 γ6 = 1− φ6
γ7 =
ν
ϕ
φ7 γ7 = f∗y + φ7ρ∗y − φ7
γ8 =
ν
ϕ
(φ8 − 1) γ8 = φ8 − φ8
Then, the unknown coefficients can be solved for:
γ1 =
αγ[ν + ϕ(1− γ)] + (1− γ)2λ
[ν + ϕ(1− γ)][α(1− βγ) + λ2] φ1 = −
(1− γ)(λ− αϕ)− να
[ϕ(1− γ) + ν][α(1− βγ) + λ2]
γ2 =
1− µ
ν + (1− µ)ϕ φ2 = −
1
(1− µ)ϕ+ ν
γ3 =
ν
ν + (1− η)ϕ φ3 =
ϕ
(1− η)ϕ+ ν
γ4 =
ν(f∗pi − ρ∗pi)
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
φ4 = −ϕ(1− f
∗
pi) + ν
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
γ5 = − ν(f
∗
pi − ρ∗pi)
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
φ5 =
ϕ(ρ∗pi − f∗pi)
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
γ6 =
ν
ν + ϕ
φ6 =
ϕ
ν + ϕ
γ7 =
νf∗y
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗y)
φ7 =
ϕf∗y
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗y)
γ8 = 0 φ8 = 1
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By plugging these solutions for the unknown coefficients into the guessed solution for
the interest rate (3.23), the interest rate reaction function (3.18) is obtained:
it =
αγ[ν + ϕ(1− γ)] + (1− γ)2λ
[ν + ϕ(1− γ)][α(1− βγ) + λ2]ut +
1− µ
ν + (1− µ)ϕgt
+
ν
ν + (1− η)ϕρt +
νf ∗y
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗y)
y∗t +
ν(f ∗pi − ρ∗pi)
ν + ϕ(1− ρ∗pi)
pi∗t +
ν
ν + ϕ
∗t
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Financial globalization in the 19th century:
Germany as a financial center1
4.1 Introduction
Financial globalization is not a new phenomenon of the late 20th century. An important
era of financial globalization and integration took already place in the 19th century. In
the 19th century, Europe was the world’s banker, lending capital to countries around
the world (Feis, 1930). The main capital exporter was Great Britain, followed by France
and Germany, and their capital cities were the main financial centers intermediating
credit through their stock exchanges and bankers. London emerged as an important
financial center following the Napoleonic Wars and became the undisputed international
financial center in the 1870s. Another important financial center in the 19th century was
Paris, second only to London, and contributed significantly to the financing of foreign
governments and railroads since the 1820s.2 At the beginning of the 19th century,
Frankfurt was the financial center of Germany and also of importance on an international
level. Following the political and economic restructurings in Germany during the mid
1860s, Berlin developed as Germany’s financial center.3 In the early 20th century, New
York emerged as another important financial center challenging London’s primacy (Burk,
1992).
The capital exports of a country are one way to quantify its importance as an inter-
national financial center. However, the collection of data on historical capital flows are
a challenging and time-consuming task. For Great Britain, Stone (1999) compiled an
1This chapter is based on joint work with Graciela Kaminsky.
2Detailed descriptions of the developments of London and Paris as financial centers are provided, e.g.,
in Cassis and Bussière (2005).
3Kindleberger (1974) describes the characteristics of financial centers and the development processes
leading to the formation of national and international financial centers.
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extensive data set building on previous work. The characteristics of British capital flows
have been studied extensively but surely not conclusively. The characteristics of France
and Germany as smaller capital exporters have been investigated to a lesser degree and
to our knowledge no extensive data sets are available. However, figure 4.1 provides a
glance at the relative importance of the three financial centers in terms of capital exports.
Germany established as an important financial center after the Deutsche Reich was
founded in 1871 following the German-French war. The territory then defined persisted
until 1914. In addition to the political unification of Germany, most areas of economic
life were harmonized afterwards. In 1873 the gold standard was introduced and in 1875
a central bank, the Reichsbank, was created. The era from 1870 until 1914 was char-
acterized by a great expansion of economic activity in nearly all sectors, a further shift
from an agricultural to an industrial economy and a concentration of powers, enterprises,
and capital. The rapid economic expansion was primarily the consequence but also the
cause of a fast growing population and with the transition to an industrial economy ur-
banization rates increased. While Germany experienced net migration outflows until the
mid 1890s, it turned into inflows until 1908. During most of the years, Germany had a
negative balance in the trade of goods but a positive current account balance. The main
imports were raw materials, intermediate goods, and food while exports were dominated
by industrial products, especially chemicals and textiles. National income and savings
were steadily growing and made Germany a net creditor. (Hoffmann, 1965; Riesser, 1912)
Before World War I, Germany was an important capital exporter; however, the amount
of foreign securities issued in German capital markets did not growth but varied signifi-
cantly over time. Between 1883 and 1913, Germany invested roughly 680 million British
pounds in foreign securities (630 million capital called) corresponding to an average of
22 million pounds per year.4 The capital was predominantly invested into European
countries but also other regions obtained considerable amounts of capital. In the first
half of the 19th century, private banks were the main financial intermediaries for foreign
securities, but they were increasingly displaced by the joint-stock banks.
The goal of the present study is to analyze the role of Germany as a financial center by
characterizing aggregate issuances and in particular foreign issuances in German stock
exchanges. The floatation of domestic securities clearly dominated aggregate issuances,
quantitatively and qualitatively, and was closely linked to German economic activity.
Foreign issuances were less clearly related to German economic growth than to external
4The amounts originally reported in mark are converted at the exchange rate of 20.4 marks per British
pound.
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conditions. The large majority of foreign securities were bonds and the main issuers were
governments and railroad companies. The main beneficiaries of the foreign investment
were Germany’s neighboring countries. Furthermore, more developed and less distant
countries were more likely to additionally float equity in Germany. Thus, informational
frictions and the pecking order relevant for trade in financial assets in the late 20th
century seem to have been important already in the late 19th century. As most of the
large international bonds were issued simultaneously in the main financial centers, the
conditions in German capital markets relative to Great Britain and France were likely
important determinants of foreign issuances in Germany. Therefore, we provide insights
into the degree of financial integration between the three main financial centers. We
find that shocks affecting the interest rate differential between Germany and France had
a significant impact on foreign issuances in Germany. Furthermore, the low interest
rate differentials between the three financial centers suggest a high degree of financial
integration.
Previous work on German capital exports focuses mainly on the seeming contradic-
tion between the capital exports and the apparent capital shortage in German capital
markets. This discussion embraces also the determinants of German capital flows, in
particular, whether political or economic considerations were the main drivers of foreign
investment in the 19th century, see, e.g., Lenz (1922), Feis (1930), and Esteves (2008).
Several studies have significantly contributed to the literature by qualifying and quan-
tifying the nature of German capital exports further, e.g., Pohl (1977), Schaefer (1993),
and Esteves (2008). However, these studies focus either on the determinants of German
capital exports from the perspective of the issuing countries and, thereby, on the pull
effects on capital flows, e.g., Esteves (2008), or on the conditions in German capital mar-
kets as determinants for the investment in foreign securities, e.g., Tilly (1992). We add
another aspect to the analysis and study the characteristics of Germany as a financial
center.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the devel-
opment of German capital markets, the main players involved in foreign issuances, stock
exchange regulations, and the process of issuance. Section 4.3 presents our data sources
and characterizes both aggregate domestic and foreign securities issued in Germany;
then, it analyzes the structure of German capital exports through the individual foreign
securities sold in Germany. The role of external shocks on foreign issuances in Germany
and the role of Germany as a financial center are studied in section 4.4. Section 4.5
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concludes and provides an outlook to future research.
4.2 Capital markets, main players, and regulations in
stock exchanges
Germany was the third most important capital exporter during the 19th century lend-
ing to countries around the world. At the beginning, when government credit was the
primary application, capital was mainly intermediated by private banks. Starting in
the 1830s, the financing of the railroad construction and of the advancing industries
exceeded the funding capacity of private banks and, therefore, financial intermediation
shifted towards the stock exchanges and to the newly created joint-stock banks. Until
the 1860s, Frankfurt was the financial center of Germany but lost its status to Berlin
following the political and economic reorganization of Germany.5 Next, the develop-
ments of the German stock exchanges and the main intermediaries of foreign credit are
examined. Afterwards, the regulation of the stock exchanges and the process of issuance
are described.
4.2.1 Development of the German stock exchanges
The onset of modern trading at the stock exchange in Frankfurt a.M. is placed around
the turn of the 19th century. The rise of Frankfurt a.M. as a financial center was
paralleled by the decline of Amsterdam which was the most important market for gov-
ernment bonds until the end of the 18th century. From the beginning, Frankfurt was an
important financial center on an international level and intermediated credits to foreign
governments. At that time, the banking house Gebr. Bethmann was one of the most
important private banking houses and intermediated the majority of German govern-
ment credit and made bond financing an important area of business from the middle of
the 18th century onwards. Frankfurt’s importance as financial center rested also on the
presence of the M.A. Rothschild & Söhne whose German headquarters were located in
Frankfurt. The Rothschilds increasingly displaced the Gebr. Bethmann and dominated
the intermediation of international credits. The Frankfurt stock exchange was the most
important one in Germany until the 1860s when Germany was politically reorganized
5Kindleberger (1974) describes the transition from Frankfurt as the financial center to Berlin and back
to Frankfurt after World War II.
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and Berlin became the capital of the newly founded Deutsche Reich. As a consequence,
the Frankfurt stock exchange lost importance relative to Berlin although in absolute
terms it was still growing.6
The foundation of the stock exchange in Berlin was based on a decree from 1796
and it had its first formal regulation in 1825. The railroad construction period in the
middle of the 19th century and the induced trading in railroad equity are considered
the cornerstone for Berlin’s importance as a financial center.7 Frankfurt was mainly
a stock exchange for bonds, in particular government bonds, and the private bankers
in Frankfurt refused to introduce equity for a long time. In contrast, the Berlin stock
exchange was open to equity and introduced numerous railroad shares. This contributed
to a substantial shift in financial intermediation from Frankfurt to Berlin and, thereby,
to the relocation of the financial center. The stock exchange in Hamburg was the third in
importance in Germany after Berlin and Frankfurt. When Amsterdam lost its position as
premier financial center, Hamburg was a major beneficiary of the reallocation of foreign
trade and, thus, of trade financing. At the onset of World War I, Hamburg had achieved
a comparable position as Frankfurt as financial center (Gömmel, 1992).
In addition to their specialization in market segments, the lending of the three main
German stock exchanges was regionally specialized as illustrated in table 4.1. According
to the tax statistics reported by the Börsen-Enquete-Kommission (1893), the majority of
foreign securities, 81 per cent, was taxed at the stock exchange in Berlin. Although the
location where the taxes were paid did not necessarily coincide with the place of issuance,
it gives an idea of the relative importance of the three stock exchanges. The countries
outside Europe drew nearly exclusively on the Berlin stock exchange while North &
Central Europe relied mostly on the Hamburg stock exchange. The Frankfurt stock
exchange was an important alternative to Berlin for South and East European borrowers.
The stock exchanges were important market places for investors and intermediating
banks. However, international loans and investments were also made outside the stock
exchanges, mainly by the banks.
6Wormser (1919) describes the developments of the stock exchange in Frankfurt in detail.
7The development of the Berlin stock exchange is analyzed at length by Spangenthal (1903) and
Gebhard (1928).
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4.2.2 Main players
The investment in international securities and the intermediation of international loans
were made both by private banks and joint-stock banks. However, while financial in-
termediation was dominated by private banks until the middle of the 19th century, the
increase in loan volumes to finance the construction of railroads and the heavy indus-
try led to the formation of joint-stock banks. Following the concentration process in
the banking sector in the late 19th century, the so-called Great Banks dominated the
financial intermediation.8 The universal banks, pursuing all kinds of banking activities,
were characteristic of the German banking system in contrast to the specialized British
banks. The German banks engaged in the underwriting, formation, and reorganization
of companies while they refrained from creating pure deposit banks. During all times,
they were also involved in the intermediation and underwriting of foreign securities.
(Riesser, 1912)
Until the middle of the 19th century, foreign loans in Germany were mainly intermedi-
ated by private banks who lent their own capital. However, as the demand for financing
increased beyond what banks could handle by themselves, the banking house Bethmann,
founded 1748 in Frankfurt, and other private banks created the Partialobligation and,
thereby, started the intermediation of securities. Through the Partialobligation banks
acquired external funds while explicitly acknowledging the actual borrower and, thus,
excluding any liability.9 The trading of these securities was then a next step. In Frank-
furt, the Bethmanns and the banking house B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. (founded
1674) were the main bankers around 1800. Later on, the Rothschilds became the main
private bankers in Frankfurt were Meyer Amschel Rothschild founded M. A. Rothschild
& Söhne with his sons in 1810. The presence of the Rothschild brothers in all impor-
tant financial centers was pivotal for their outstanding international financial role since
private contacts and relations as well as local knowledge were crucial in overcoming in-
formation asymmetries.10 Other important private banks in Frankfurt were Jacob S.
8Riesser (1912) provides a detailed account of the German banking system, its activities, and the
concentration process.
9With the Partialobligation, the private banks created a new financial instrument to acquire external
funds which could then be lend. The novelty was that the banking house borrowed funds from
numerous private persons, bundled them, and lent the amount as one loan. The bankers wrote
partial certificates of debt to the lenders but were not anymore liable in case of bankruptcy of the
borrower. It thereby represented a new form of financial intermediation between small investors and
big borrowers without the private bankers being personally liable. (Wormser, 1919)
10The Rothschild office in London was established in 1804 and in Paris in 1812/15. The agencies in
Vienna and Naples, established in 1816 and 1820, respectively, were branches of the Rothschild office
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H. Stern (1805), Lazard Speyer-Ellissen (1846), and Erlanger & Söhne (1859). Frank-
furt was the most important banking center until around 1860, followed by Cologne.
The most important private banks in Cologne were Sal. Oppenheim & Cie. (1789)11
and A. Schaaffhausen (1790). Until the financing of the railroad construction and the
heavy industry started in the 1830s, the main banking business was government loans.
With the railroad construction, Berlin gained importance and with it the main private
banks Gebr. Schickler (1796), S. Bleichröder (1803), Mendelssohn & Co. (1805), and R.
Warschauer & Co. (1849). Hamburg played a special role in foreign trade financing and
the most important private banks were L. Behrens & Söhne (1780) and M. M. Warburg
& Co. (1798). (Wormser, 1919; Gebhard, 1928; Born, 1977)
As the financial needs and transaction volumes of both industries and issuance busi-
ness increased further, it became more and more difficult for private banks to manage
these by themselves even with external funds. Especially the financing of the railroad
construction posed a big challenge to private bankers. As a consequence, private banks
cooperated both informally through syndicates and formally through the foundation
of new banks. As a matter of fact, most joint-stock banks were created by private
bankers or were the result of reorganizing an existing private bank. In the first foun-
dation wave between 1848 and 1870, four of the Great Banks were established. The
A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein was founded 1848 in Cologne through the recon-
struction of the bank house A. Schaaffhausen. In 1851 the Disconto-Gesellschaft was
founded in Berlin and became an actual joint-stock bank in 1856 through a change in
legal status. Also the Bank für Handel und Industrie, founded 1853 in Darmstadt by
the private bankers Gustav Mevissen and Abraham Oppenheim, was a major player in
the intermediation of international loans. Due to its location in Darmstadt, the bank is
generally known as Darmstädter Bank. (Riesser, 1912) The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft
was founded in 1856 under the participation of Mendelssohn & Co., S. Bleichröder,
Robert Warschauer & Co., and Gebr. Schickler. In the second wave of joint-stock bank
foundations starting in 1870, the Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank were established.
In 1870 Gebr. Schickler, A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, Gebr. Sulzbach, and others
founded the Deutsche Bank in Berlin. The Dresdner Bank was built in 1872 on the basis
of the private bank house Michael Kaskel in Dresden in cooperation with the Berliner
Handelsgesellschaft and relocated to Berlin in 1881. (Gebhard, 1928) From the late 19th
in Frankfurt until 1844, when they become independent offices. Born (1977) discusses the role of
personal networks in overcoming information asymmetries further.
11Salomon Oppenheim was founded 1789 in Bonn and relocated to Cologne in 1801. (Born, 1977)
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century onwards, a strong concentration process took place in the banking sector and
until the beginning of the 20th century, most private banks were taken over by the Great
Banks. For example, the business of the Rothschilds in Frankfurt was taken over by the
Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1901 and the Frankfurt bank house Erlanger & Söhne by the
Dresdner Bank in 1904. (Born, 1977)
While most private banks in Germany had their origins in the trade and shipping
business or were the private financiers of German sovereigns, in the last quarter of the
19th century the German joint-stock banks emerged as universal banks, involved in all
types of banking activities. They engaged in the financing of industries, trade, and gov-
ernments through underwriting, foundation, and reorganization activities and through
the foundation of appropriate institutions, both domestically and internationally. The
Great Banks improved and extended their international business first by creating affil-
iates abroad, later by founding new banks overseas and delegated part of the interna-
tional issuance business.12 However, the private banks and the Great Banks continued
to carry out the biggest international transactions by themselves. The underwriting and
issuance of foreign securities was in general directed by syndicates, mostly international
ones, formed for a limited number of transactions or even individual deals. Only very
few syndicates or banking groups dominated the business with a specific country over
prolonged time periods. (Born, 1977) When syndicates issued securities, the underwrit-
ing syndicate was often different from the introducing syndicate and it was common
that the underwriters themselves gave sub-participations to other banks to reduce their
economic responsibilities. In general, the leader of the syndicate then actually sold the
securities at the stock exchanges or entrusted another company or bank to do so. Mostly,
the securities were issued piecewise trying to influence the price. (Lotz, 1890)
4.2.3 Regulation of the stock exchanges
In the first half of the 19th century, the German stock exchanges were subject only to
self-determined regulations and not to government regulation, except for the ban on
forward trading in Berlin. Due to widespread speculation first in Spanish, then in other
foreign securities, and finally in railroad equity, consecutive regulations were established
that prohibited forward trading in these securities between 1836 and 1844 in Berlin
and were abolished only in 1860. (Spangenthal, 1903) The Stock Exchange Act of 1896
12Otto (1910) and Steinmetz (1913) elaborate on the activities of the Great Banks overseas including
their foundation activities.
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was the first one to regulate the stock exchanges on a national level. The regulation
followed closely the recommendations of the Börsen-Enquete-Kommission (Committee
of the Stock Exchange Inquiry) who conducted a detailed analysis of the stock exchanges
in Germany. The new regulation restricted forward trading in securities significantly,
required the publication of a prospectus for securities applying for admission to trade,
and made the underwriting banks accountable for the content of these prospectuses.13 As
the individual stock exchanges had their own rules governing the admission of securities
for trade already prior to the Stock Exchange Act, the consequences of the regulation
for capital markets and the intermediaries are not trivial. The restrictions in forward
trading are often mentioned as having contributed to the concentration in the banking
system, e.g., Fohlin (2002). The induced increase in spot transactions severely reduced
the flexibility of capital markets and favored bigger banks over private banks. The
prospectus requirements are unlikely to have significantly affected foreign issuances as
also the UK and France had similar requirements for the floatation of foreign securities.
Wetzel (1996) does not find any statistically significant impact of the Stock Exchange
Act on domestic and foreign issuances and Fohlin (2002) finds only a small effect on the
concentration in the banking system.
Furthermore, starting in 1881, the government imposed two types of taxes on trading
in securities, an issuance tax (Effektenstempel) and a turnover tax (Umsatzstempel). The
issuance tax was levied on all securities sold at an initial public offering in Germany with
the exception of German government bonds; the turnover tax was levied on all security
transactions. For both taxes, different rates applied to different types of securities and to
domestic and foreign borrowers. The tax rates were successively increased in 1885, 1894,
1900, and 1909. Starting in 1894, the issuance tax was also due on foreign assets bought
outside of Germany if the investor resided in Germany and the securities were not held
in an account abroad.14 The tax increases on foreign securities significantly reduced
the attractiveness of the German stock exchanges for both foreign issuers and domestic
investors. The displacement of German capital to foreign stock exchanges might have
been significant. According to Fritzsche (1913), German investors increasingly bought
foreign securities outside the German capital markets; the amount of foreign securities
held in deposits outside the country, and, thus, not subject to the taxes, increased nearly
threefold between 1893 and 1902, from 7.5 million pounds to 22 million pounds.
13Wetzel (1996) discusses the Stock Exchange Act and its implications in detail.
14Details on the tax regulation and the successive amendments are described, e.g., in Meyer (1902),
Kleiner (1914), the Frankfurter Zeitung, and the Deutsche Oekonomist.
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While German central government bonds were automatically admitted for trade at
the stock exchanges, all other securities had to apply for admission which had to be
formally filed for by a German bank. The admission of foreign securities was required
for the whole amount issued and not only the share offered for subscription in Germany,
thereby facilitating the international trade in these securities. (Kleiner, 1914) Even
though the admission to official trading had the advantage of facilitating the issuance
and placement of a security, numerous securities were sold exclusively on the free market.
A very rough estimate of the relative importance of the free market, i.e., the trading
outside the stock exchanges, is provided by the Börsen-Enquete-Kommission (1893) for
the stock exchange in Hamburg. While only 129 foreign securities with a face value of
17 million pounds were officially introduced to the Hamburg stock exchange between
1880 and 1892, 678 securities with a nominal amount of 27 million pounds were taxed.15
This leaves 10 million pounds to 549 not officially admitted securities, corresponding to
37 per cent of the value of the foreign securities bought by German investors. However,
it also points at the fact that the big international issuances were traded through the
stock exchanges while it were mainly smaller securities bypassing the stock exchanges.16
4.2.4 The process of issuance
Zickert (1911) describes the most common ways foreign securities were sold in Germany.
The main ways of introducing new foreign securities to the investing public were the
advertisement through newspapers and circulars and the recommendation by banks and
bankers to their clients. Foreign securities were sold either through the introduction at
a German stock exchange or directly by the banks to their customers. Through their
deposit banks and affiliates the Great Banks had direct access to private investors and
could sell foreign securities without requiring the admission to a stock exchange to make
the information available. Especially foreign securities underwritten by syndicates were
often not placed on stock exchanges but directly sold to the banks’ customers. The
quantity of foreign securities publicly offered for subscription while bypassing the stock
exchange administration office was also non-negligible. Zickert (1911) estimates that
in 1909 and 1910 approximately 11 per cent of all foreign securities were offered for
subscription without being admitted to a stock exchange. To introduce a foreign secu-
15The tax applied to all foreign securities bought by German investors, independent on whether they
were bought through a stock exchange or not.
16The average amount of the officially admitted securities was 132 thousand pounds, while the not
admitted securities only amounted to 18 thousand pounds on average.
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rity to the stock exchange, the underwriters had to apply for admission; afterwards, in
general, an invitation for subscription followed. However, it had become common prac-
tice among underwriting banks at the turn of the century to carry out the subscription
prior to the successful admission to a stock exchange as pointed out by the Deutsche
Oekonomist (August 5, 1899; July 9, 1904). The banks justified this procedure with the
time-consuming admission process in Germany which left them with a disadvantage over
their fellow underwriters in international syndicates and would require them to refrain
from such activities. (Zickert, 1911)
Marx (1913) distinguishes two ways in which new securities were distributed to the
public: direct and indirect issuance. In case of a direct issuance, the person or company
raising capital offered its securities directly to the public though public subscription
or over the counter. Direct issuance was only common practice for German govern-
ment bonds until the middle of the 19th century, afterwards they were mediated mainly
through the Prussia-Syndicate. The more common form was the indirect issuance where
a banker or bank syndicate intermediated between the public and the capital searcher. In
general, the banks underwrote the whole security, i.e., they bought it for a fixed transfer
price and distributed it at their own expenses to the public. For foreign issuances only
the indirect method was relevant. The security was then sold to the public either by pub-
lic issuance, i.e., through subscription invitations or introduction to a stock exchange,
or by sale over the counter, advertised through letters to customers and non-customers.
Securities issued and sold over the counter were very hard to capture statistically as the
process took place off the public without announcements, prospectuses or suchlike in the
public press or in other public form. Usually, more than one issuance method was used
at a time.17
4.3 International issuances
The time period under scrutiny starts in 1883, the year in which the Deutsche Oekono-
mist started publishing data on securities issued on the German stock exchanges and
when the turbulences following the Gründerkrise (Founding Crisis) of 1873 most likely
already faded. As the capital markets basically shut down when World War I started,
our sample period ends in 1913. The data sources are described next. Then, the aggre-
gate amounts of capital floated on the German stock exchanges between 1883 and 1913
17Lotz (1890) provides a very detailed description of the issuance process in Germany.
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are analyzed and the similarities and differences between domestic and foreign issuances
are studied. Finally, we look at foreign investments made between 1883 and 1897 by
using disaggregated data of foreign securities issued on the German stock exchanges.
4.3.1 Data sources
To quantify the amount of domestic and foreign securities issued on the German stock
exchanges, the most widely used and valued statistics are provided by the Deutsche
Oekonomist located in Berlin and the Frankfurter Zeitung located in Frankfurt. The
purpose of the issuance statistic of the Deutsche Oekonomist was to provide “the most
precise possible answer to the question to which extent the capital and money markets
have been drawn on by issuances of securities during a specific time period” (January 14,
1911). Thus, only officially admitted securities, based on prospectuses were included. In
general, the overall amount admitted based on the subscription price or the introductory
rate was reported even though only a fraction may have been introduced during the ad-
mission year or allocated following the subscription. It was especially common for real
estate and agricultural mortgage bonds that the issuance was extended over prolonged
time periods.18 Conversions, restructurings, and mergers were excluded; only increases
in capital were included. (Deutsche Oekonomist, January 14, 1911) A peculiarity of
foreign securities was that the application to German stock exchanges had to be made
for the whole amount issued and not only the share offered for subscription or sold in
Germany. As has been pointed out also elsewhere in the literature, e.g., Bankenquete
(1910) and Marx (1913), it is extremely hard if not impossible to accurately know the
shares of foreign securities actually placed in Germany. The Deutsche Oekonomist states
that “the issuing house only knows the exact amount actually placed in Germany dur-
ing the here considered limited time period after the issuance; but it will reveal this
amount only possibly if it was sold out, an information not identical to the information
that there was an over-subscription” (September 11, 1909). Nevertheless, the Deutsche
Oekonomist reported tentative estimates of the amount of international securities sold in
Germany based on information of the issuing houses if available. However, this detailed
information is only available until 1897 as the Deutsche Oekonomist stopped publishing
detailed lists with the securities sold in Germany. The reason provided by the Deutsche
Oekonomist was that the number of securities had increased too much to report them
18The Deutsche Oekonomist reported rounded estimates of the German mortgage bonds for the current
year and revised them when the bank statistics were made. (July 13, 1895)
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individually (January 14, 1899). However, at the same time the Kaiserliche Statistische
Amt (Government Statistical Office) started publishing the amounts of securities ad-
mitted for trade. As the amounts of foreign securities admitted for trade exceeded the
amounts sold in Germany by wide margins, this information is only of limited use for
the analysis of capital exports intermediated by the stock exchanges.
The issuance statistic of the Deutsche Oekonomist is available starting in 1883, while
the statistic of the Frankfurter Zeitung is available only for a much smaller time period,
starting in 1896. We therefore follow Esteves (2008) and other related literature in using
the data provided by the Deutsche Oekonomist. The amounts originally stated in marks
are converted into British pounds at the exchange rate of 20.4 marks per pound.
4.3.2 Aggregate issuances
The aggregate amount of securities issued in the German stock exchanges during a
specific year is a measure of new capital investments, both in domestic and foreign ap-
plications. The aggregate issuances in Germany increased over the sample period and
fluctuated with four local peaks broadly corresponding to peaks in the German busi-
ness cycle19: in 1888 (98 million pounds), 1899 (110 million pounds), 1905 (148 million
pounds), and 1908 (164 million pounds), see figure 4.2. Capital was invested both in Ger-
man and foreign securities. While the amount invested in domestic securities increased
over time, foreign securities fluctuated without trend, see figure 4.3. The fluctuations in
aggregate issuances were mainly driven by domestic issuances exhibiting a very similar
time pattern20, with the exception of the peak in 1905 due to an outstanding amount
of 60 million pounds in foreign securities. Foreign securities quantitatively dominated
total issuances only until 1886; afterwards their share declined with the exception of two
peaks around 1897 and 1905.
The variations in foreign issuances were dominated by the floatation of government
and railroad bonds, see figure 4.4. The exceptional amount of foreign issues in 1905
is related to the Russian-Japanese war. The war led to the floatation of a Russian
government bond of 12 million pounds and three Japanese government bonds summing
up to 16 million pounds, thereby accounting for half of all foreign securities floated
that year. Government bonds were also an important determinant of fluctuations in
19These peaks correspond both to periods of high economic growth and to peaks in the detrended
German GDP series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
20The correlation between the two series is 0.94.
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domestic securities, see figure 4.5. Furthermore, investments in mortgage and industrial
securities were quantitatively significant while railroad securities played nearly no role
among domestic securities. The railroad boom in Germany took place earlier in the
19th century and most railroad companies were nationalized starting in the late 1870s.
(Riesser, 1912; Tilly, 1992) Hence, railroads were mainly financed through government
securities afterwards. While government bonds exhibited a similar pattern as overall
economic activity, industrial securities increasingly displaced mortgage securities.
In the aggregate, 82 per cent of capital was invested in bonds and only 18 per cent in
equity. The preference for bonds was even stronger for foreign securities: only 8 per cent
of the foreign securities floated in Germany were equity. However, the relative impor-
tance of bond versus equity financing varied significantly over time, both for domestic
and foreign securities and across sectors, see figure 4.6. Bonds were mainly issued by do-
mestic and foreign governments, followed by domestic mortgage institutions and foreign
railroad companies. The industrial sector in Germany was the main receiver of equity
financing. Furthermore, German banks issued substantial equity. Investment in foreign
equity, however, was mostly directed towards railroad financing and, at the beginning
of the 20th century, increasingly towards the banking sector. As bondholders are senior
lenders relative to equity holders, investing into bonds involves a lower risk than into
equity. Accordingly, the issuance of equity was particularly volatile. Furthermore, infor-
mation asymmetries between lenders and borrowers may be exacerbated by geographical
distance and, thus, be higher for foreign than domestic investments.21
Different types of financial instruments involve diverging degrees of risk and so do dif-
ferent types of borrowers. Even though governments can, and sometimes do, default on
their debt, government bonds may be considered safer investments than bonds of other
issuers. Due to their taxing power, insolvency is a lesser concern for governments than for
private enterprises. Furthermore, less information is needed to evaluate a government’s
financial situation than a private company’s one.22 In the 19th century, most railroad
companies enjoyed some form of government guarantees, either explicitly or implicitly,
and, therefore, the investment risk was reduced as compared to industrial companies.
Private industrial companies may be considered the riskiest borrowers as the available
21German investors’ knowledge of foreign countries was probably very limited and, therefore, the risks
involved when investing in these countries substantial. By lending through bonds the risk could
be reduced. The role of informational frictions for trade in financial assets is discussed in the next
section.
22In the 19th century, information asymmetries were most likely substantial as the transmission of
information was costly, see, e.g., Flores (2007).
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information relative to the necessary one was probably the least and the solvency risk
substantially higher than for governments and government guaranteed railroad compa-
nies.
Germany invested in securities of countries around the world and countries were dif-
ferent and involved diverging degrees of actual and perceived risk. The disaggregation
of foreign securities to the country or at least regional level helps in identifying patterns
in the foreign investment and is pursued in the next section.
4.3.3 Individual foreign securities
German capital was financing governments, railroads, and industrial companies around
the world. Using disaggregated data on the foreign securities floated in Germany reveals
the countries and regions that were the main beneficiaries of the capital flows and con-
tributes to our understanding of foreign investment decisions. However, the Deutsche
Oekonomist provided disaggregated data only until 1897. The collection of the disaggre-
gated data for the remaining period until 1913 is the subject of ongoing research. Still,
the reduced sample from 1883 until 1897 offers interesting insights into the characteristics
of German capital exports and is therefore analyzed in detail.
Table 4.2 illustrates the main regional pattern in foreign investment made through the
German stock exchanges between 1883 and 1897.23 The majority of foreign securities,
i.e., 80 per cent, was issued by European countries, more specifically Austria-Hungary
and Russia who received 21 and 22 per cent, respectively, followed by South Europe,
i.e., mainly Italy, with 16 per cent. The second most important continent were the
Americas whose securities floated in Germany accounted for 16 per cent of all interna-
tional issuances, with only a slightly higher share in North America than Latin America.
However, the relative importance of the regions varied over time, see figure 4.7. During
the late 1880s, the Americas gained considerable weight in international issuances, es-
pecially through increased floatations of Latin American securities. However, between
1891 and 1894, no Latin American securities were floated in Germany, probably as a
reaction to the Baring crisis in 1890.24 The composition of the European securities also
varied substantially. The South European countries increased the floatation of securities
in the late 1880s and early 1890s when Austria-Hungaria had a low participation and
23We focus on the country of location of a railroad, bank, or company, and, thereby, concentrate on
the characteristics and risks of the country where the business was carried out as compared to the
nationality of the owner.
24For a discussion of the Baring crisis, see, e.g., Flores (2007).
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Russia did not contribute at all to the foreign issuances in German stock exchanges.
Figure 4.8 provides a more detailed picture of the countries floating securities on
the German stock exchanges between 1883 and 1897. Austria-Hungary was the main
issuing country with 89 securities floated, followed with a considerable gap by the United
States (43 issues), Italy (42 issues), and Russia (35 issues). However, the size of issues
varied considerably across countries. The average size of securities floated was highest
for Russia and Mexico, both with 2.2 million pounds, followed by Argentina with 1.8
million pounds. Accordingly, the relative importance of countries in terms of funds
obtained from German capital markets is a different one. Russia and Austria-Hungary
clearly dominated with 78 and 76 million pounds, respectively, followed by Italy (46
million pounds), and the United States (30 million pounds).
The types of investment between regions also differed substantially, see table 4.2.
Investment in Africa, North America, and South Europe was mainly related to railroad
financing, securities issued by Latin American and South-East European countries were
mostly government bonds while Asian, i.e., Chinese, securities were exclusively issued
by the government. Investment directed towards the banking, industrial, and mortgage
sectors played a non-neglegible role only in Austria-Hungary, North and Central Europe.
As previously pointed out, bonds were the dominant type of securities sold on German
stock exchanges. However, equity financing played also a role for applications in North
America, North & Central Europe, South Europe, and Africa, especially for railroad
projects. Industrial equity was highest in Austria-Hungary and North & Central Europe
with roughly 2 million pounds each and bank equity in Austria-Hungary with 2 million
pounds. These findings are consistent with some stylized facts in the literature on
trade in financial assets. Germany invested predominantly in neighboring countries
confirming a common pattern. Portes and Rey (2005) find that a gravity model performs
very well in explaining international trade in financial assets. They explain the strong
negative correlation between geographical distance and asset trade by informational
frictions proxied by distance. The knowledge of neighboring countries is generally higher.
However, Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) do not find that equity investments react stronger
to informational frictions than bond investments.
In our sample period North America issued equity in Germany while Latin America
did not. Likewise, North and Central Europe as well as South Europe issued equity but
it played nearly no role for South-East Europe. Thus, we find a tendency that close
and more developed countries received more equity investment. This may be due to
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informational asymmetries being lower for neighboring countries and more developed
countries being perceived as less risky. The equity investment into African railroads
was nearly exclusively into the Dutch-South African railroad company. The company
was founded in the Netherlands but was actually a German company. (Baltzer, 1916)
Due to the railroad’s location in South Africa it is considered foreign investment in
Africa, even though the nationality risk was European. Thus, the investment may have
been perceived as less risky thereby strengthening our findings. Daude and Fratzscher
(2008) find an actual pecking order in foreign investment determined by informational
frictions and institutional quality in the host country. Portfolio investment is much more
sensitive to both determinants than direct investments or bank loans. Therefore, FDI and
loans dominate investment in less developed countries while portfolio investment is more
prevalent in developed countries. However, in our dataset we currently cannot distinguish
between portfolio investment and FDI and, therefore, we cannot draw inference in this
regard.25
The decision to invest into a foreign security depends also on the asset’s riskiness.
One risk measure is market liquidity: if assets can be easily sold, the risk is lower. The
issuance frequency of a borrower in German stock exchanges is a possible proxy for
market liquidity. The more often a borrower issues securities in Germany, the higher
the circulation of the borrower’s securities and, thus, the more likely significant trade is
taking place. Furthermore, investors may have better information on borrowers already
present in German financial markets. We next look at the frequency in which coun-
tries issued securities in Germany. Thereby, we learn which countries had permanent or
only temporary access to German capital markets and get some insights about investors’
knowledge of specific countries. Figure 4.9 accordingly depicts borrowing behavior on
German stock exchanges on a yearly basis. The incidence of new issuances varied signifi-
cantly across countries. While some of the main recipient countries like Austria-Hungary,
Italy, and the United States floated securities nearly every year, Russia as one of the
main borrowers did not float securities between 1889 and 1893. This, however, was due
to political considerations. Between November 1887 and October 1894, the Reichsbank
was not allowed to accept Russian bonds as collateral for loans, thereby, Russia was
25The distinction between portfolio investment and foreign direct investment is not clear-cut. The
related literature characterizes the securities intermediated through the stock exchanges as portfolio
investment. In contrast, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) define an equity participation above 10 per
cent as FDI. However, this information is not available for our sample. In any case, equity that may
be considered FDI or portfolio investment accounts only for 8 per cent of the foreign securities in
our sample and the remainder is portfolio investment.
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indirectly denied access to the German capital market.26 Countries like Switzerland and
Sweden floated securities nearly every year even though in absolute terms they were
not among the main recipient countries, while other countries like Argentina, China,
and Mexico floated securities only during a couple of years but received noteworthy
amounts of capital. Yet other countries only floated securities in Germany only once like
Algeria, Canada, and Cuba. As we do not have information on denied issuances and
amounts issued through other financial centers, we do not know the underlying reasons,
i.e., whether a country issued only seldom securities in Germany because of denied access
or because no access was requested. Not surprisingly, the majority of securities issued
in Germany were rather small in size, both bonds and equity, see figure 4.10. The large
international bonds were in general issued by international syndicates and placed not
only in Germany but also in London, Paris and smaller financial centers.
4.4 The role of external shocks
The foreign securities floated in Germany were mostly issued simultaneously in other
countries, especially in the two main financial centers, London and Paris. Hence, the
quantity of foreign securities floated in Germany was not only determined by the con-
ditions in the borrowing countries and on German capital markets but also by the con-
ditions in other financial centers, most importantly London and Paris. In this section,
we examine if shocks to these other financial centers affected the floatation of foreign
securities in Germany.
4.4.1 The model
Consider a simple partial equilibrium model of the German capital market. There are
n countries including Germany, the UK, and France. All countries need funds that are
supplied only by the UK, France, and Germany as financial centers. Hence, all the other
countries are just borrowers. The German capital market is in equilibrium when the
funds demanded equal the funds supplied.
n−1∑
i=1
Di(RG, RG−RUK , RG−RFr, Y i)+DG(RG, RG−RUK , RG−RFr, Y G) = SG(RG, rG, rpG)
26A more detailed description of the Lombardverbot and its implications for financial transactions is
provided by, e.g., Feis (1930) and Born (1977).
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The demand for German funds, Di, depends on the interest rate RG at which countries
can borrow from Germany and on the interest rate differential between Germany and
the UK, RG − RUK , and between Germany and France, RG − RFr, as countries can
alternatively borrow from the UK or France. When the interest rate in Germany is
higher than in the UK, for example, the demand shifts towards the British capital
market. Therefore, the demand for German funds depends negatively both on the level
of the German interest rate and the differentials against the other financial centers.
Furthermore, the demand increases with economic activity in the borrower country, Y i.
Investors in Germany have the alternative between lending to risky domestic or foreign
countries/firms at an interest rate RG and investing at the risk free rate rG. Hence,
the supply of funds in Germany, SG, depends positively on the risky interest rate and
negatively on the risk free interest rate. The risk aversion of German investors and the
overall risk of investments are captured in the term rpG that determines the degree of
substitutability of the risky and the safe asset. We take RUK and RFr as exogenous.
Aggregating the demand for funds of non-German countries, DF , we obtain the supply
of funds to non-German borrowers as follows:
DF (RG, RG −RUK , RG −RFr, Y F ) = SG(RG, rG, rpG)−DG(RG, RG −RUK , RG −RFr, Y G)
Then, solving for RG, we obtain a reduced form equation for foreign issuances in Ger-
many:
IG(rG, rpG, RG −RUK , RG −RFr, Y G, Y F ) (4.1)
Hence, foreign issuances depend negatively on the risk free interest rate and the risk term
rpG. When the opportunity cost of the risky investment, the riskiness of the investments
themselves, or the risk adversion of German investors increase, foreign issuances are
lower. The effect of a change in the interest rate differentials on foreign issuances is
ambiguous. An increase in the differential reduces the demand for German funds but
increases the supply of funds to non-German borrowers. The relative interest elasticities
of demand and supply determine whether the overall effect is positive or negative. An
increase in economic activity in the borrower countries increases the demand and, hence,
has a positive effect on foreign issuances. An increase in German economic activity,
however, reduces the supply of funds to non-German borrowers.
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4.4.2 Estimation
The reduced form equation for foreign issuances in Germany (4.1) is estimated by re-
gressing the log of the nominal amount of foreign securities issued in Germany each year
on the following explanatory variables. We use the private discount rate in Germany as
the risk free interest rate.27 The term rpG capturing both the risk aversion of German
investors and the riskiness of investments can be proxied using a variety of indicators.
The share of countries defaulting on sovereign debt in a given year measures the aggre-
gate default risk, a higher share implying higher risk. The differential between a long-
and a short-term interest rate provides a measure of the term premium, assuming that
an increase in the term differential reflects higher risk. The term premium is measured
as the difference between the long-term government bond yield and the private discount
rate in Germany. A third indicator is the amount of foreign securities issued in Great
Britain, the premier financial center, as a proxy of liquidity in financial markets: higher
issuances are a sign of higher liquidity and, thus, lower risk. We transform foreign is-
suances in Great Britain by using the negative value. Then, an increase in each of the
three indicators reflects an increase in risk. All indicators have their relative merits and
caveats and are correlated. Therefore, instead of choosing one indicator, we derive the
principal components of the three risk indicators and use the first principal component
as explanatory variable. The first principal component explains 69 per cent of the total
variability of the risk indicators and the second principal component an additional 23 per
cent. The first principal component is a roughly equal linear combination of the three
risk indicators and can be interpreted as overall investment risk. The first two principal
components are illustrated in figure 4.11. The interest rate differentials between the
financial centers are measured with long-term real interest rates obtained by substract-
ing the inflation rate from the long-term nominal government bond yields. Economic
activity in Germany is measured by the GDP growth rate while economic activity in
the rest of the world is proxied by the GDP growth rate in the UK. The reason is that
the UK was the premier financial center and we assume that when the UK entered a
recession, so did the rest of the world. An alternative measure is the growth rate of
world exports and is used as a robustness check. The data sources are described in table
4.3. Figure 4.12 illustrates the fluctuations in the real interest rate differentials and the
27The private discount rates were the interest rates negotiated in the transactions between credit in-
stitutes (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1976). The original interest rates are in nominal terms and are
converted into real interest rates by substracting the inflation rate.
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private discount rate in Germany, while figure 4.13a depicts the GDP growth rates in
Germany and the UK.
Equation (4.1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) techniques. Foreign
issuances are truncated at zero, however, the log of foreign issuances is not. The advan-
tage of OLS is that the estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as compared
to Tobit estimations. As a robustness check we perform our estimations also for foreign
issuances in levels using Tobit techniques. The results of the estimations are reported in
table 4.4 and figure 4.14 shows the actual series of the log of foreign issuances as well as
the fitted values and residuals for specification (1). While column (1) in table 4.4 is the
baseline regression including all the above described variables, the regression in column
(2) excludes economic activity in Germany and the UK.
The main insight is that the conditions in financial markets both in Germany and
relative to the other financial centers as well as aggregate risk mattered for the amount
of foreign securities floated in German stock exchanges. As expected, higher private
discount rates in Germany and higher risk discouraged foreign lending in Germany.
While an increase in the long-term interest rate in Germany relative to France affected
foreign issuances in Germany negatively, the differential between Germany and the UK
does not have a statistically significant effect. This can be interpreted as follows. The
interest rate semi-elasticity of the demand for funds of non-German borrowers is higher
than the interest rate semi-elasticity of supply. Hence, Germany and France seem to
be substitutes as financial centers for borrowers. The effect is quite substantial: a one
percentage point increase in the interest rate differential decreased foreign issuances by
roughly 80 per cent. As the interest differential between Germany and France ranged
between -0.2 and 0.8 per cent, the changes in the differential were commonly much
smaller than one percentage point, see figure 4.12. The semi-elasticity of foreign issuances
with respect to changes in the interest rate differentials is higher than with respect
to changes in the domestic short-term interest rate. This may suggest that foreign
shocks mattered more for international issuances than domestic shocks. However, an
increase in the differential may be due to both an increase in German long-term interest
rates and a reduction in long-term interest rates in the respective other financial center.
Therefore, these estimations do not provide clear guidance in this respect. Furthermore,
the small interest rate differentials and their low volatility in figure 4.12 suggest that
the financial centers were highly integrated. Economic activity in Germany and world
economic activity, however, are not statistically significant in explaining foreign issuances
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in Germany.
Thus, only financial conditions seem to matter for the amount of foreign securities
floated in Germany and not economic activity, neither in Germany nor in the rest of the
world. Together, they explain roughly 45 per cent of the variation in foreign issuances.
4.4.3 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our findings, we repeat the estimations for the level of foreign
issuances in Germany as dependent variable and use Tobit estimation techniques. The
results are reported in table 4.5. Additionally, instead of using the log of nominal foreign
issuances in Germany, we state foreign issuances in real terms and in terms of capital
called, respectively. Thereby, we can check if forces related to the overall price level in
Germany or to the discount on foreign securities are driving our results. As bonds and
equity are fundamentally different types of foreign investment, e.g., with respect to the
seniority of lenders and, thus, their riskiness, we run separate regressions for the two
types. The estimation results are reported in table 4.6. Furthermore, we alternatively
use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered deviations from GDP trend to measure economic
activity in Germany and proxy world economic activity accordingly by the HP filtered
deviations from GDP trend in the UK. Graph 4.13b illustrates the fluctuations of these
variables over the sample period. The detrended data series are smoother than the
growth rates; the estimation results, however, are not affected. Another proxy for world
economic activity is the growth rate of world exports. The regression results are reported
in column (3) in table 4.4.
In all cases, our results are not affected substantially. Only the estimation for foreign
equity performs badly and the variables are neither individually nor jointly significant.
This suggests that for the investment in equity other forces than the here mentioned
ones are in place. The literature on trade in financial assets finds that distance as a
proxy for informational frictions can explain cross-border flows in equity. The inclusion
of variables related to distance in the estimations is planned for future research. Fur-
thermore, we are working on including an index describing the taxation of issuances as
control variable. As discussed previously, taxes on foreign issuances seem to have been
important determinants for the amount of foreign securities floated in Germany and have
displaced part of foreign investment to other financial centers.
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4.5 Conclusion
After the political unification in 1871 Germany was an important financial center and the
third largest capital exporter at the turn of the 20th century. German foreign lending
was predominantly directed towards European countries, however, also other regions
received substantial funds. While private banks dominated the intermediation of foreign
credit in the first half of the 19th century, they were successively displaced by the joint-
stock banks. The broad picture emerging from the present analysis of German foreign
investment in the late 19th century is the following. German lending was mainly bond
financing and directed towards its neighboring countries. Furthermore, more advanced
economies (either perceived or actual) and less distant countries were more likely to
additionally float equity in Germany. Thus, informational frictions and the pecking
order relevant for trade in financial assets in the late 20th century, seem to have been
important already in the 19th century.
Furthermore, we stress the role of Germany as one financial center besides Great
Britain and France. Borrowers could choose in which financial center to float their
securities and often they issued securities simultaneously in the main financial centers.
In the econometric analysis we find that German foreign investment did not only react
to conditions in German capital markets but also to interest rate differentials relative
to France. When interest rates in Germany increased relative to France, less foreign
securities were issued in Germany. Aggregate risk was also an important determinant
of foreign investment. However, the present analysis abstracts from investors’ choice
between financial markets to invest their funds. This may be the subject for future
research.
To further spur our understanding of financial globalization at the turn of the 20th
century, we are working on extending the present analysis. This includes the extension
of the disaggregated data series on foreign securities to span a longer time period and
to include a broader set of financial assets. This data will then allow us a more in-
depth analysis of the drivers of German foreign investment and the relative importance
of Germany as a financial center.
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4.A Appendix: Figures and tables
Figure 4.1: Foreign issuances floated in the main financial centers.
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Note: Issuance data for France is only available starting in 1892.
Sources: Stone (1999), Saul (2005), and Deutsche Oekonomist.
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Table 4.1: Regional specialization in lending by the German stock exchanges, 1882-1892.
Berlin Frankfurt Hamburg
million share million share million share
pounds pounds pounds
Africa 7.64 95.6% 0.35 4.4% 0.00 0.0%
Asia & Pacific 0.25 100.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0%
The Americas 34.62 90.82% 2.55 6.7% 0.98 2.6%
North America 16.71 93.4% 1.12 6.3% 0.06 0.3%
Latin America 17.91 88.4% 1.43 7.0% 0.92 4.6%
Europe 171.45 79.2% 28.93 13.4% 16.15 7.5%
Austria-Hungary 26.20 80.9% 5.58 17.2% 0.60 1.9%
North & Central Europe 10.21 39.5% 3.25 12.6% 12.40 47.9%
Russia 47.35 96.2% 1.41 2.9% 0.44 0.9%
South Europe 53.23 77.7% 12.55 18.3% 2.70 3.9%
South-East Europe 34.47 84.9% 6.13 15.1% 0.00 0.0%
Total 213.96 81.4% 31.82 12.1% 17.13 6.5%
Source: Börsen-Enquete-Kommission (1893) and authors’ calculations.
These amounts were taxed at the respective stock exchanges and most likely were also issued
there. The shares are relative to the overall amount of securities of a specific region taxed in
Germany, i.e. either in Berlin, Frankfurt, or Hamburg. The regions are defined as follows.
Africa: Egypt and South Africa; Asia & Pacific: China; North America: Canada and USA;
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Mexico; North & Central
Europe: Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom; South Europe: Italy, Portugal, and Spain; South-East Europe: Greece, Rumania,
Serbia, and Turkey. The choice of the regional groupings is based on purely geographical
considerations.
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Figure 4.2: Aggregate issuances floated in Germany.
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Figure 4.3: Domestic and foreign issuances floated in Germany.
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Figure 4.4: Foreign issues floated in Germany by sector.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 8
8 3
1 8
8 5
1 8
8 7
1 8
8 9
1 8
9 1
1 8
9 3
1 8
9 5
1 8
9 7
1 8
9 9
1 9
0 1
1 9
0 3
1 9
0 5
1 9
0 7
1 9
0 9
1 9
1 1
1 9
1 3
i n
 m
i l l i
o n
 p
o u
n d
s
government railroad bank, industrial & mortgage
Figure 4.5: Domestic issues floated in Germany by sector.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 8
8 3
1 8
8 5
1 8
8 7
1 8
8 9
1 8
9 1
1 8
9 3
1 8
9 5
1 8
9 7
1 8
9 9
1 9
0 1
1 9
0 3
1 9
0 5
1 9
0 7
1 9
0 9
1 9
1 1
1 9
1 3
i n
 m
i l l i
o n
 p
o u
n d
s
government railroad bank, mortgage & insurance industrial
100
Chapter 4. Financial globalization in the 19th century: Germany as a financial center
F
ig
ur
e
4.
6:
Fo
re
ig
n
an
d
do
m
es
ti
c
is
su
an
ce
s:
bo
nd
s
an
d
eq
ui
ty
by
se
ct
or
s.
Fo
re
ig
n 
bo
nd
s
0102030405060
1883
1885
1887
1889
1891
1893
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
in million pounds
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
m
or
tg
ag
e
ra
ilr
oa
d
in
du
st
ria
l
Fo
re
ig
n 
eq
ui
ty
012345678
1883
1885
1887
1889
1891
1893
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
in million pounds
ra
ilr
oa
d
ba
nk
in
du
st
ria
l
D
om
es
tic
 b
on
ds
02040608010
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
1883
1885
1887
1889
1891
1893
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
in million pounds
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
m
or
tg
ag
e
ra
ilr
oa
d
in
du
st
ria
l
D
om
es
tic
 e
qu
ity
0510152025303540
1883
1885
1887
1889
1891
1893
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
in million pounds
ra
ilr
oa
d
ba
nk
in
su
ra
nc
e
in
du
st
ria
l
101
Chapter 4. Financial globalization in the 19th century: Germany as a financial center
Table 4.2: Pattern of foreign investment, 1883-1897.
Region govern- railroad bank, bond equity as share of
ment industry & total
mortgage issuances
Africa 25.5% 72.4% 2.1% 86.5% 13.5% 2.2%
Asia & Pacific 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 2.6%
The Americas 40.8% 57.0% 2.3% 90.6% 9.4% 15.5%
North America 1.4% 95.9% 2.8% 83.0% 17.0% 8.5%
Latin America 89.1% 9.1% 1.7% 100.0% 0.0% 7.0%
Europe 49.6% 37.4% 13.0% 91.6% 8.4% 79.7%
Austria-Hungary 49.7% 30.3% 20.0% 91.2% 8.8% 21.3%
North & Central Europe 46.7% 17.1% 36.2% 84.8% 15.2% 9.5%
Russia 49.4% 46.8% 3.8% 94.4% 5.6% 21.8%
South Europe 33.1% 57.2% 9.6% 87.4% 12.6% 15.6%
South-East Europe 74.7% 22.9% 2.4% 98.5% 1.5% 11.5%
Source: Deutsche Oekonomist and authors’ calculations.
The regions are defined as follows. Africa: Algeria, Congo, Egypt, and South Africa; Asia & Pacific: China;
North America: Canada and USA; Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and
Mexico; South Europe: Italy and Portugal; South-East Europe: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece,
Rumania, Serbia, Turkey; North & Central Europe: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The choice of the regional groupings is based on purely
geographical considerations.
102
Chapter 4. Financial globalization in the 19th century: Germany as a financial center
Figure 4.7: Foreign securities by regions.
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Figure 4.8: International lending: country composition, 1883-1897.
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Figure 4.10: Size of issues (in million British pounds).
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Table 4.3: Data sources.
Variable Source
Foreign issuances in Germany Deutsche Oekonomist, various issues
GDP Spliced series, Jones and Obstfeld (2001)
World exports Global Financial Data and authors’ calculations
Long-term nominal interest rates Yield on government gold bonds, Flandreau and
Zumer (2004)
Private discount rates Deutsche Bundesbank (1976)
Inflation rates General prices, Flandreau and Zumer (2004),
and authors’ calculations
Foreign issuances in the UK Stone (1999)
Default risk Standard & Poor’s (1999), and authors’ calcu-
lations
Figure 4.11: Principal components of the risk indicators.
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Figure 4.12: Interest rate differentials and private discount rate.
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Figure 4.13: Economic activity in Germany and the UK.
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Table 4.4: OLS regressions.
Dependent variable: log of (1) (2) (3)
foreign issuances in Germany
Constant 3.5728*** 3.7778*** 3.7135***
(0.6508) (0.6106) (0.5997)
Growth rate GDP in the UK 0.4053
(2.9896)
Growth rate GDP in Germany 2.1372 3.3366
(2.8659) (3.3896)
Growth rate of world exports -1.7847
(2.1284)
Real long term interest rate 1.0480 0.9716 0.9224
differential between Germany (0.6375) (0.6173) (0.6105)
and the UK
Real long term interest rate -0.8092** -0.9008*** -0.8199**
differential between Germany (0.3797) (0.2876) (0.3888)
and France
Real private discount rate in -0.4065*** -0.4097*** -0.4055**
Germany (0.1361) (0.1240) (0.1491)
First principal component of -0.2845*** -0.2991*** -0.3031***
risk indicators (0.0879) (0.0829) (0.1055)
R-squared 0.447 0.431 0.456
Adjusted R-squared 0.309 0.343 0.315
Observations 31 31 31
F-statistic 3.2388 4.9210 3.2197
(p-value) (0.0178) (0.0043) (0.0191)
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.915 1.856 1.793
Note: White robust standard errors reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 4.14: Actual, fitted, and residual series, OLS (1).
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Table 4.5: Robustness check: Tobit regressions.
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
foreign issuances in Germany
Constant 31.709** 40.334** 33.881***
(13.686) (15.650) (12.494)
Growth rate GDP in the UK -0.705
(51.431)
Growth rate GDP in Germany 83.846 100.691
(57.158) (65.022)
Growth rate of world exports -26.441
(38.0157)
Real long term interest rate 20.138 16.109 17.612
differential between Germany (12.900) (13.778) (11.881)
and the UK
Real long term interest rate -15.219** -18.809*** -15.683**
differential between Germany (7.068) (5.361) (7.218)
and France
Real private discount rate in -7.696*** -7.821*** -7.489***
Germany (2.296) (2.145) (2.499)
First principal component of -5.618*** -5.987*** -5.671***
risk indicators (1.534) (1.429) (1.815)
Log likelihood -111.7529 -112.8588 -108.5033
Observations 31 31 31
Likelihood ratio 14.5596 12.3477 14.1429
(p-value) (0.024) (0.015) (0.028)
Note: Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.6: Further robustness checks.
Dependent variable: log of in real capital only only
foreign issuances in Germany terms called bonds equity
Constant 3.777*** 3.552*** 3.566*** 0.636
(0.659) (0.648) (0.669) (1.526)
Growth rate GDP in the UK 0.699 1.165 -0.037 1.002
(2.992) (2.945) (3.105) (6.537)
Growth rate GDP in Germany 2.282 1.976 1.689 4.294
(3.045) (2.983) (2.982) (5.597)
Real long term interest rate 1.221* 0.733 1.292* -1.075
differential between Germany (0.655) (0.631) (0.711) (1.191)
and the UK
Real long term interest rate -0.891** -0.724* -0.800** -1.143
differential between Germany (0.397) (0.399) (0.376) (0.930)
and France
Real private discount rate in -0.453*** -0.344** -0.499*** 0.311
Germany (0.140) (0.135) (0.144) (0.257)
First principal component of -0.262*** -0.250*** -0.338*** 0.073
risk indicators (0.091) (0.083) (0.102) (0.127)
Adjusted R-squared 0.375 0.239 0.334 0.033
Observations 31 31 31 31
F-statistic 4.0003 2.5686 3.5121 1.1657
(p-value) (0.0065) (0.0458) (0.0123) (0.3582)
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.870 1.915 1.945 2.243
Note: Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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